

Marine Corps Gazette



Marine Corps Gazette

AUGUST 1955
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VOLUME 30

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COVER



August—the shooting month! The National Matches at Camp Perry, Reserves at summer camp firing the range and the regular run of Marines shooting for annual qualification—all striving to stay in the black. But for all the shooters' ills, the wart-fours and the "Maggie's drawers," there's only one panacea—hold 'em and squeeze 'em. The cover is by 2dLt Roger Ferriter who is holding and squeezing them himself this month as he goes through the Basic School. Back cover: the 3 top men in the Lauchheimer Trophy Match for 1955. From top to bottom, 1stLt W. W. McMillian (who set a new record), 1stLt R. E. Martin, 2nd and Capt C. E. Reese, 3d.

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
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A Bell for Sam Browne

... I was first commissioned and became a member of the Association in 1946. Since I can remember what seems to be a score of articles by LtCol Heintz on the same theme as his *Case Against the Cloth Belt*, (i.e. let's go back to the good old days). I've read his past articles with various emotions—disbelief, scorn, amazement and always laughter. *This time*, however, he has rung a bell and I heartily support his plea for the Sam Browne belt. No doubt there will be some, needing two hides to make a girth that will fit, screaming in protest. As for me, here's hoping the Uniform Board gives us a chance to hang one on the office wall.

CAPT R. A. FOYLE

Worcester, Mass.

... I would like to extend my congratulations to LtCol Heintz for his excellent article on the need to re-adopt the Sam Browne belt. Although I have never worn one of these belts, I would be most happy to see the Marine Corps include this item in *Required Articles of Uniform for Male Officer Personnel*.

1STLT L. W. TUCKER

San Diego, Calif.

... Only those who did not spend years wearing Sam Browne belts would wholeheartedly support their return; still, the article by LtCol Heintz regarding the futility of the cloth belts has much merit. Perhaps because I shall probably never again be required to wear a belt except to support my trousers, makes me adopt a more tolerant attitude towards the Sam Browne, which I have cursed generously in the past—but the curse would be off if that item were adopted for duty wear and not required for wear socially. It was the wear without arms, indoors and on the dance floor, dinner parties and so forth that made it such a plague. At dinners, how the hardware would scratch furniture. But serious consideration should be given to its readoption as a Sword Belt, and more wear of the sword encouraged. I will be glad to pass my Sam Browne (which cost, Col Heintz, within \$10 of your 10 year expenditure for cloth belts) on to my elder son whenever it is readopted!

LTCOL F. W. HOPKINS, RET.
Santa Rosa, Calif.

... Congratulations to LtCol Heintz for his excellent article *The Cloth Belt*. I was commissioned in the *new corps* in 1942, but proudly wore my Sam Browne belt for a few months before going overseas. When I returned in 1945 I had to leave my relatively new belt in the bottom of a foot locker where it remains to this day—dormant but not quite dead.

And there is one more criticism of the cloth belt that I would like to add to Col Heintz's list . . . the belt loop. Dry cleaning shops all over the Marine Corps are festooned with stout nails decorated with dust-covered belt loops collected from belts of every conceivable kind and color. Never yet have I been able to retrieve a lost belt loop that belonged on my belt. I always have three choices however: (1) go without the belt loop, (2) slip on a mismatched belt loop and hope the difference isn't too noticeable and (3) buy a new belt with a belt loop attached.

I cast my vote for the Sam Browne belt and may all cloth belts join their long lost loops on the nails of the cleaning shops!

MAJ C. R. LAPLANT

Fort Bliss, Texas



... A very hearty congratulations is in order for LtCol Heintz's article on cloth vs. Sam Browne Belts.

To add a few personal comments—while on sea duty we found that the sling could not support the sword for prolonged periods of time without sliding out like a snake from under the blouse. It was not a very pleasing ceremonial appearance.

Incidentally some South American

countries and state police forces use a Sam Browne with 2 brass eyelets which enable them to carry a .45 in the US holster on the belt. If this were incorporated as a modification it would eliminate the appearance of the OD with a sloppy off-color pistol belt which is generally the case at present.

CAPT MICHAEL SPARK

Freeport, LI, NY

NCO Career Guidance

... I would like very much to see published in future issues of the *GAZETTE* articles concerning the career plans for officers and staff noncommissioned officers and, consistent with current security regulations, a review of the missions of the Marine Corps Development Center and the Marine Corps Test Unit.

Articles such as these would tend to aid our staff noncommissioned officers in selecting their 3 preferences for duty on the NCO fitness report and would cause the reporting officer to give thought to his recommendation for the next duty assignment and Section D of the report.

I have had the good fortune to serve with many fine staff noncommissioned officers—men who are career Marines and who would appreciate the opportunity to serve in a capacity that would broaden their professional knowledge. However, most of these men have had little or no career guidance. They have no knowledge of anything existing outside their little sphere of service. Too many of them are spending their time between Marine Barracks, FMF, Sea Duty, Recruit Depot, Recruiting and/or I&I/NROTC. They get those duty stations because that is what they put on their fitness reports as being preferred—and in usual cases the reporting officer concurs. This is particularly true in the case of the men in OF 03. There isn't one school listed in the MCTrngBul 3-54 designed for the infantryman (other than officers' schools). There is one school listed under The Infantry School, Ft Benning, Ga., but you must have an 02 MOS to meet the qualifications.

The only way that a staff NCO can further his career is to either be sent to a service school, take an extension course, or be blessed with a CO who will take the time to *guide* him in the selection of his next duty station. The Engineer, Supply, Artillery, AAA, Communications and Administrative staff NCO may attend a number of service schools. The infantryman—the *backbone of the Corps*—can attend a Division NCO School, or on a Marine Corps level—the SgtMaj/1stSgt School, PISC.

The Infantry staff NCO doesn't want to get out of his field. He doesn't want to be tied down to a desk. He's reluctant to take a Navy Yard—particularly if he is in an outfit that is constantly

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improving. We do owe him a crack at an advanced infantry service school. In the absence of the school, it has been my policy to recommend the *outstanding* staff NCOs for assignment to billets such as Marine Corps Test Unit #1; Instructor, the Basic School; Marine Corps Equipment Board, or to some organization that will *profit* by their experience and, in turn, broaden the NCOs' scope of professional knowledge.

It is realized that general commands, and those commands on division level and higher, are responsible for conducting staff NCO schools. Generally speaking, these are excellent schools. The syllabi run generally parallel. Many of the career minded officers and men feel that we have a vital need for a Marine Corps-level Staff NCO School either at Parris Island or Quantico. (Too many aircraft at San Diego).

We expect quite a bit from our staff NCOs (OF 03), why don't we give them the benefit of a formal military education?

CAPT J. E. FORDE, JR

San Diego, Calif.

Recognition

... Marine Corps General Order Number 154 provides that all enlisted men on active duty will receive a speci-

fied amount of military instruction each year. This instruction is for the most part carried out by a small group of staff NCOs at each base. These men, in order to do a good job must spend an average of 5 hours preparation for each hour of teaching, and yet, usually receive no credit for this additional work. This is not a plea for more privileges, glory or pay, but merely for recognition of the fact that this difficult task is part of their duties. It would seem that the fairest, and easiest way to give these men credit would be through the medium of the fitness report. Why not, when these men are assigned as military instructors, list that as an additional duty, and have the training officer give markings on the individual's fitness report? This would give the man some credit for the extra duty, and in cases of men up for promotion, would certainly give the selection board something extra to consider.

TSGT DONALD M. BRUCE

Barstow, Calif.

Straw Man

... The use of the 4.5 inch multiple rocket launcher in an antimechanized role became a reality as early as 1952, possibly earlier. When the 1st Marine Division moved to the western zone near Panmunjom the threat of a mechanized

attack soon became apparent. The volume of fire contributed by the rockets as well as their flexibility and ease of movement made them readily acceptable for such an antimechanized role.

However, the effectiveness of the weapon in an antitank role is doubtful. As an area neutralizing weapon it is highly satisfactory. An armor attack is certain to be followed by troops, so the rocket can be used to neutralize the personnel, freeing other weapons to attack the tanks.

Colonel Wade leaves some doubt in one's mind when he speaks of a chemical energy shell. First thoughts lead one to think of it as a HEAT shell. If such is the case it is doubtful that it would prove worthwhile as we could not be satisfied with seeking only random hits over the area. (It would take a hit to neutralize a vehicle.) This situation could be corrected with the development of a projectile similar to the present land mine. If such a projectile were perfected for use by artillery and rockets, it would allow Marines to lay a mine belt in front of any approaching armor column.

CAPT SAMUEL M. MORROW

Ft Sill, Okla.

Wherefore?

... Incentive plan, re-enlistment bonus, improved quarters etc, but where is the prestige for the staff NCOs? We, the career Marines in the staff NCO ranks, the professional soldiers, the nucleus from which all fighting units in the Marine Corps will be built for any future war or police action, ask this question.

Many high ranking officers, at various times within the past two years have been quoted as saying that the Marine Corps staff NCO, has proved himself to be, both in combat and garrison, a devoted and dedicated unit leader and, as such, should be accorded the prestige befitting his rank. The status quo, in regard to the staff NCO, in some instances is even lower today than at the initiation of the so-called prestige program.

In one breath we are asked to set examples in appearance, leadership and conduct, to use initiative and ingenuity in the performance of our duties, to be the epitome of Marines at all times. In the next breath, we are told to fall out and stand in ranks to have our rifles inspected along with PFCs and Pvs, to lay out clothing and equipment with these same PFCs and Pvs. Is this prestige? Increase in pay is not the criterion for which career Marines re-enlist! To know, that upon attaining the rank of staff NCO, we have reached a station of prestige and leadership, an objective for the junior NCOs; this is far more incen-

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
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tive to us than any financial reimbursement voted by Congress.

For most of us in the infantry field who have proved our right to our rank, and gained much of our experience in combat, the present situation is deplorable. Regardless of all the publications about incentive plans, most TSgts can resign themselves to retiring on "20" at their present rank. What, then, must we look forward to—prestige! Not a word in a memorandum that ends up in the circular file, but the consideration and respect due us as top-ranking, long experienced NCOs in the world's greatest fighting outfit.

TSgt ROY M. WEAVER
San Diego, Calif.

Distinctive Badges

... There have been discussions from time to time in your Message Center about the advisability of having Marines wear shoulder patches to identify Fleet Marine Force units to which attached; or to wear the equivalent of the Combat Infantry Badge for those earning them in combat. Generally, the arguments against such devices seem to stem from the idea that a Marine is a Marine for all that, and doesn't need any means of distinction or identification other than those indicated by his uniform and his medals, ribbons or badges.

At the risk of hearing similar comments, however, I would like to make a recommendation for a badge to distinguish those Marines who qualify as helicopterborne troops, or heliotroops.

The qualification, for instance, could be based on a required course of helicopter flights, in training exercises or as otherwise prescribed.

This would serve to emphasize to the individual Marine, and others, the importance attached by the Marine Corps to the helicopter concept.

As a corollary to this recommendation, it is also considered appropriate to recommend consideration of the award of hazardous duty or flight pay to those personnel who fly a certain number of hours per month as helicopter borne troops.

LT COL H. J. WOESSNER
Homewood, Ill.

Fiscal Help

... I believe most of us will agree that fiscal accounting within the Marine Corps is not a coming thing—it's here to stay. Officers and men concerned with this fiscal work will find data pertaining to their duties in any number of Marine Corps publications, ranging from General Orders to Supply Bulletins. I suggest the following to help alleviate the fiscal situation.

Why not establish a separate series of publications called Marine Corps Fiscal Memorandums or Fiscal Bulletins etc, thereby giving fiscal personnel one or two files for handy reference? Even though it is necessary to give some accounting data in other publications, such data could be repeated and condensed into a Monthly Fiscal Memorandum or Bulletin.

The above suggestion would certainly

improve the efficiency of commands involved in the fiscal accounting cycle. Fiscal and commanding officers alike may then have a readily accessible, short-form file of accounting information with which to keep themselves posted. After all, we've got Ordnance, Supply, Information and Technical publications, so why not *Fiscal*?

CAPT W. N. JACKSON
San Francisco, Calif.

A Marines' Guide?

... The Army has *The Noncom's Guide*; the Navy *The Petty Officer's Guide*; the Air Force *The Airman's Guide*. Why not *The Marine's Guide*?

The present *Guidebook for Marines* is devoted almost exclusively to weapons and training. It fails to cover the material one must search several manuals and regulations for.

I propose the Marine Corps Association publish *The Marine's Guide*. Get specialists to furnish the chapters. I would be glad to be associated with this activity which, I believe, would provide invaluable indoctrination and be a source of continued education.

MSGT ROBERT LEVY
San Francisco, Calif.

Ed: *The idea certainly has much merit and such a publication would satisfy an existing need. However, the proposition that the Association enter into the book publishing field was considered at a recent meeting of the Editorial Board. It was determined that the staff available is not adequate to the task and the financial considerations involved preclude projects of this nature.*

Wrong Way?

... While reading Capt Canzona's article in your June issue I noticed the photo on page 55 marking the advance of the 1st and 2d Bns was in error.

During the time of 3-6 September 1950, I was a member of D-2-5 and it is my contention that the arrows marking the advance of the 2-battalion attack should have started more on the left and worked toward the right as I have marked.


I also believe that the village in the illustration is Katol, if my memory serves me correctly.

SSGT ROBERT N. COTE
Boston, Mass.

Ed: *SSgt Cote's version of the attack is shown in white superimposed on the original illustration. Anyone else have another version? (See cut left.)*

Colossal Pyramid


... The article entitled *The Clerical Pyramid* by Captain Sedora, in the June issue, can and should be the most important article you have published this



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
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year. Somehow, it should be reprinted as a leaflet and a copy sent by Headquarters to every officer and every 1st sergeant and sergeant major rated on the rolls. Inspecting officers, down to include battalion level, should be required to check and report to their seniors on the manner in which the spirit and letter of the article are being carried out. Company commander and 1st sergeant reports of fitness should show under remarks the degree of co-operation shown.

Prompt and sincere adherence to the instructions contained in this article will permit the release of hundreds and hundreds of men to line duty at a saving of money or gain in firepower. It will also serve to provide better administration and *more* time for the personal problems of the private and private first class in the company office—now so sadly neglected that it definitely has a bearing on the AWOL and non-shipover rate.

I have been looking at the Marine Corps for 35 years, as a 1st sergeant, sergeant major and a lieutenant colonel. I do not quite claim that Captain Sedora offers a panacea for *all* of the ills which may affect the Marine Corps, but he comes close to it. I know that his article is not only practical but positively a lifesaver to Marine Corps administration. But only inspection and insistence from each supervising and command echelon can make it work.

LTCOL F. W. HOPKINS, RET.
Santa Rosa, Calif.

... The *crying jag* Captain Sedora refers to in the June issue is typical of the thinking currently popular in the Corps. Starting with the reporting unit (a company and/or battery) facts, not generalities, will be considered. A 1stSgt and one clerk (the L-Series T/O authorizes 2, but find them—what company or battery has 7 clerks?) perform the administrative duties which consist of: Preparing the Diary, IRCs, MPRs, Maintenance of the SRBs, MOS reports, Pay Orders, Court data (preparing charge sheets for the Battalion Commander's Office Hours), Embarkation rosters, rifle range rosters and just plain rosters, routine assignment i.e., messmen, working parties, training records, Red Cross, Navy Relief, March of Dimes Drives, Bonds, Schools, Fire Bills, Request Mast SOP, and in spare time, files.

As an example, to make a UA diary entry is simple. What follows the entry? SRB entries, Pay Orders, inventory of government and personal property, letter to the next of kin. Upon return from UA, the same amount of work is involved, in addition the legal work is added consisting of Unit Punishment Sheets, Charge Sheets, restriction or

confinement forms, inventory of clothing again etc.

So much for the routine duties in the office paper pyramid. Faulty office management is not necessarily the primary cause for administration continuing to be complex. HQMC is not satisfied with *Volume I*, MCM being the SOP for Administration but publishes Memos, Bulletins, orders, etc. regularly. These are amplified by FMF, Division, Regiment and finally reams of paper fall into the company/battery. They must be read before they can be acted on, thereby restricting the 1stSgt's active participation in field work.

Administrative workload continues to pyramid while a unit is enroute to or from maneuvers which recur with monotonous regularity.

What officer or NCO can remember the last time he went into the company/battery office when he didn't stop work the clerk was doing? Multiply this several times and today's work is either done tonight or carried over until tomorrow.

When athletic events take place, early liberty is granted to the company/battery. But when the rest of the outfit shoves off, you'll find the clerk atop the paper pyramid burning midnight oil.

Closer observation will reveal that you find training requires 20 hours spread over different days and at different times. This does not account for the time spent going to and from these designated training places. Therefore the clerk is not available for 22 working days per month. Recommendation: That the Marine Corps accept the fact that certain duties are specialized and clerical duties are within this category. Infantry Training Regiments can and do indoctrinate the young Marine in the basic rules of warfare. Upon completion of this course the Marine can, if qualified, then pass into another phase of his training—a specialty such as electronics, clerical, etc.

In conclusion, it is the general opinion of all company/battery commanders, 1stSgts and clerks that the "Paper Pyramid" is not caused exclusively by the company/battery administration procedures, but is due rather to the many directives and changes thereto, promulgated by higher authority. In addition, the current T/O is not realistic in that the numbers of personnel authorized are insufficient to handle the paper work in an efficient and expeditious manner.

1stLt W. E. WILLETT
Camp Lejeune, NC

Ed: That's a mouth-full for all the company/battery commanders in the Corps.

... My disagreement with Captain Sedora's *The Clerical Pyramid* is so violent as to move me to attempt a spirited rebuttal; however, I'm so firmly wedged between the *In* and *Out* baskets here at my desk that I can't find time.

HARRIED ADMINISTRATOR
HQMC, Washington

ED: In a postscript the "harried administrator," who doesn't claim to be an administrator at all, says he is motivated by the humor of it. LtCol John Williamson, of the IG's staff, visited most of the Posts of the Corps last spring. Which foot is the "harried" shoe on?

Longer Tours?

... With the ever-increasing emphasis on economy, while maintaining or increasing our efficiency, our personnel and operating procedures have borne greater scrutiny.

A current topic in this premise is the question of increasing the tours of duty of stations, particularly those changes involving cross-country travel.

Longer tours will save many dollars. But will they maintain our efficiency?

Confining ourselves to our three divisions, how can longer tours at administrative commands increase the efficiency of the personnel involved when they return to FMF duty?

Here is a course of action that is certainly applicable and feasible even under the present system of two or three-year tours.

For annual marksmanship firing send all personnel to Camp Pendleton or Camp Lejeune, as applicable, for two weeks. However, all personnel should be required to fire a one-week course, since sufficient requalification training can be given during that time.

During the second week these personnel should be formed into units organic to the regiments and separate battalions of the division, i.e., infantry personnel to the rifle companies, weapons platoons; artillery and tank personnel to the artillery regiments and tank battalions etc. They can be used to bring units up to strength, where necessary, the remainder used either as excess to T/O or as "replacement" personnel, particularly during periods of training involving mock warfare. If the number available for a given unit is too small for proper employment, they can at least function as "observers" or be placed in an on-the-job training status.

Regardless how used within the divisions, these visitors, from administrative commands, ships' detachments etc, will have spent one week with an FMF unit. They will have had one week of "life with the troops" during which time they


will have been exposed, at least, to the latest in concepts, tactics, techniques, weapons, equipment and materiel.

Will they not return to their parent commands as better Marines? Certainly their efficiency and potential for FMF duty will have increased. And they will certainly constitute a more effective "combat force in being," more readily adaptable to the type of mobilization necessitated by Pearl Harbor and Korea. No doubt others can think of many more advantages. Any disadvantages are considered negligible since, after all, the FMF is our common denominator.

One more point, and a vital one. Too many of our Reserves, as well as our single-enlistment men, have gone back to civilian life without having spent a day with or near an FMF outfit. I have talked with many of them. Their disappointment is keen and in their eyes and hearts justified. We have not prepared them for their possible recall to active duty for combat purposes. The above-proposed program will give them at least two or three weeks of FMF duty. How else can we give them a sense of "belonging" and at least set off a spark of the regimental spirit?

If wiser heads than mine see limitations in my proposal let us at least give it a fair trial within the unavoidable

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NEW OFFICER AND STAFF NCO UNIFORM REGULATIONS

Marine Corps Memo 49-55 has established the following regulations:

Officers

1. The topcoat (with half belt) is a required item of uniform for all regular officers (including temporary officers and reserve officers on active duty) who are on duty at activities which require enlisted personnel to have this item.
2. Since 1 July 1955, the officers' short coat has been obsolete and its wear is prohibited.
3. The "beaver" overcoat will be obsolete and its wear prohibited after 30 June 1956.

Staff NCOs

1. All SgtsMaj, 1stSgts and MSgts are authorized, at their option to purchase and wear both summer and winter service uniforms of same material as worn by Marine officers, provided insignia, chevrons, buttons and other distinctive features of the enlisted uniform are retained. Officers' frame cap covers may be worn, sans quatrefoil on the crown. This uniform may be worn by these senior NCOs in garrison (except in formation) or on leave or liberty.
2. The same provisions apply to all TSgts and SSgts except that they may only wear the summer uniform, and this only on leave or liberty.

ALL Personnel

1. The frame cap will be worn at all times by all personnel except for FMF units in the field, aviation personnel during flight and personnel in transit under orders.
2. A green scarf of rayon-acetate has been adopted for wear with the overcoat, topcoat and raincoat M-1950. It may also be worn by FMF units in the field, with the utility and summer service uniforms. This will be available for issue and purchase during FY 56.
3. The standard bronze tie clasp is a required item of uniform at all times when the necktie is worn as part of the service uniform.

limitations. We can gain much of what we need.

MAJ M. SALVAGGIO
San Diego, Calif.

Mistaken Identity

ED: Readers will recall the article "Combatting Soviet Guerrillas" by Ernst von Dohnanyi in the February GAZETTE. The author of the article is a former German officer who now resides in Germany, as was explained in that issue. The selection of a nom de plume was made quite arbitrarily with no thought in mind of embarrassing any individual, and the chance that the name chosen might do so was considered so remote as to be improbable.

The GAZETTE has since learned that there is an individual with that name living in the US—Professor of Music, Ernst von Dohnanyi of the University of Florida. He has been greatly embarrassed by the inference that he was associated with the article. He is 77 years old, a resident of this country, and in no way participated in, or contributed to, the activities of either side as described in the article. The GAZETTE regrets the unfortunate coincidence.

Tortoise & Hare Dept

... I noticed on page 25 of the May issue a picture of Marines, loaded down with field transport packs, embarking in an HR2S. Lord help us if the new concept envisions a quick, mobile lightning thrust by helicopter borne troops stumbling along loaded down with field transport packs.

CAPT P. C. ROE
Quantico, Va.

Cussed Caps

... In regards to Sgt Maynor's design for a cap to replace the Garrison Cap, (May issue), I think the Sergeant has a good idea even though the design shown looks to be a little on the order of the old German forage cap.

Having come to Japan a year ago bringing my barracks hat along, I found on unpacking, in place of the neat rounded frame, a misshapen piece of leather and wire which a ragpicker wouldn't wear. The idea for a flexible cap is especially good in view of the circumstances outlined above.

The visor is also quite in order, as witness anyone who has had to be out in one of the Japanese light cloudbursts we have over here. Not only does the rain obscure vision, but the present garrison cap usually turns into a soggy mess which only a trip to the laundry can repair.

Whether we adopt the Sergeant's cap, the barracks hat or the old campaign

hat, let's do something about the present garrison cap!

MSGT BILLY S. MASON
3d Mar Div



Champion for Comanche

... I would like to concur wholeheartedly with the fact that the artillery FDC Needs Modernization and that the mechanical computer may be the solution to some of our problems. However, until the mechanical computer is perfected we must accomplish fire direction in the best manner we can with the equipment which we have, namely, GFT fans (Rizza fans), GSTs, firing charts, target grids, radios, telephones, switchboards and last, but not least, our most constant instrument—a few Marines.

There is no well founded reason to discard the Comanche system of fire direction and return to an outdated method of adjusting fire, as one might reason the authors of *FDC Needs Modernization* would prefer to do from several of the statements made in their article. The Comanche system offers the advantages of easy and brief instruction in the adjustment of fire by the forward observer and a simple graphical solution to the development of firing data. The first point must not be overlooked since we will be relying on inexperienced personnel to adjust fire in the event of another conflict. To cite an example of this situation, in Korea, at one time, over 50 per cent of the forward observers were 03s. As far as the FDC procedure being slow and complicated to teach under this system, it has been my experience that students—Marine, Army and foreign—with little or no background in artillery—have had little trouble in grasping the principle of the Comanche-type fire direction.

With our future enemy possessing the capability of atomic weapons, we will be forced to employ the batteries of the artillery battalion with far more dispersion than in the past. Due to this fact I believe it is time to advocate a system of fire direction in which the battery is the firing data producing unit in the artillery battalion. A possible solution to this problem is one of the systems now being tested by the Army. This system establishes the firing battery as the producer of the firing data. This data may be checked by the battalion

FDC or by the battery itself. This check would eliminate the large errors as well as the small ones which the Comanche system has the capability of causing. If the battalion FDC executes the check, the S-3 can maintain control over all firing, even to the extent of issuing the S-3 order. In the event the battery is producing and checking its own data, the S-3 can keep abreast of the situation by monitoring the fire missions on radio or wire.

By use of a system of this type, it would give us the necessary decentralization that would be needed in the event of communication interruption whereby the batteries would have to operate as independent units. In addition, it would provide us with a sufficient number of artillery officers who are versed in fire direction center operation with the necessary on-the-job experience.

Since the S-3 has been relieved of the duty of checking all of the firing data produced, he can apply himself more to the best use of his artillery in view of the tactical situation. In doing this I feel that the S-3 and the S-2 should work hand in hand. For this reason the S-2 deserves a place in the S-3 (FDC) tent where he will be available to the S-3 at all times.

The new series of radios and telephones may be integrated with each other by the use of a switchboard. It is my belief that the switchboard belongs in the S-3 (FDC) tent, where it will be accessible to the S-3 in the event he may need to alter the communication setup to accomplish a mission.

With the S-3, S-2, switchboard and the other necessary personnel working in one tent, it is granted that the working space will become crowded. For this reason it is suggested that a new or modified type of CP tent be developed to house the FDC.

By using this system or a system developed along these lines I believe that we would have a fire direction center which would not only be modernized but in addition, we would have an FDC which would be projected into the future—an FDC which could cope with the problems of an atomic war.

I would like to go further into my beliefs and some of the reasons behind them; however, I am not sure that an article on artillery only would be published so soon after *FDC Needs Modernization*. If there is a possibility of publication of such an article I would welcome the opportunity to put my views into print.

CAPT CHARLES K. WHITFIELD
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

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introducing

PERHAPS NO ONE HAS A WIDER knowledge of the Korean armistice negotiations than **Col James C. Murray**, whose article on those negotiations, *The Prisoner Issue* (page 32) begins this month.



COL MURRAY

On 8 July 1951 he went behind the enemy lines at Kaesong to contact the Communist envoys to arrange for the opening of the armistice conference. More than 24 months later, on 27 July 1953 as Senior Liaison Officer, he was in charge of the signing of the instrument of the armistice. In the interval he served as liaison officer between the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in the negotiations. On three separate occasions he negotiated the demarcation line which separates the opposing armies. His experience in the negotiations on the exchanges constitutes the basis for his article. The Colonel was commissioned via the NROTC (Yale) in 1936. He participated in the defense against Communist aggression with the American Mission to Greece. His observations there furnished the basis for writing *The Anti-Bandit War*, published last year in the GAZETTE.

FORMER EDITOR OF THE QUANTICO *Sentry*, **TSgt Don Kelly** offers a solution to an old problem in *Let 'Em Shoot* (page 28). TSgt Kelly joined the Corps in 1942 and during WWII he was



TSGT KELLY

at Espirito Santo, Efate and Guam. From 1946 to 1949 he was editor of the *Ewa Snow* in Hawaii and in 1950 was ordered to the 2d Marine Division Information Service Section. He became editor of the *Quantico Sentry* in 1953, and in 1954

he was transferred to his present job as information chief, Service and Technical Information Branch, Division of Public Information, HQMC.

Capt Charles B. Haslam RETURNS to the pages of the GAZETTE with *Why A Heavy Barreled Rifle?* (page 46). Currently Test Officer, MCEB, Quantico, he has had a varied career in the Marine Corps. He enlisted in 1937, served 4 years as a gunner with the 3-inch AA, then left the Corps in 1941 and was employed by the Navy as an ordnance man. In 1942 he re-enlisted and was commissioned soon after. During WWII he was in the Solomons and the Marshalls and after the war he attended Ordnance School, ABC School, Naval Justice and Special Weapons School. Reverted to MSgt in 1946 he was appointed to WO later that year and again was reverted to MSgt in January 1948. Commissioned again in 1948 he served with Maintenance Company in Korea as executive officer and company commander.

A DESIRE TO ASSIST REGULAR OFFICERS assigned to organized Reserve units in understanding the young Reservist prompted **Maj Verne C. Kennedy, Jr** to write *Marine Reserves and Summer Camp* on page 14. Maj Kennedy has served with the organized Reserves since he was released from active duty in 1947. He is currently executive officer, 1st Weapons Bn, USMCR, Cicero, Ill. He



MAJ KENNEDY

was commissioned in the Army Ordnance Corps upon being graduated from the University of Michigan. In June 1942 he received an appointment in the Marine Corps Reserve and reported to the 10th ROC at Quantico. After completing the course he was awarded a regular commission. During WWII he served with the 12th Marines in the Bougainville, Guam and Iwo Jima operations. At the end of WWII, after a short tour of duty at HQMC, Maj Kennedy was accepted as a student Naval Aviator. In the summer of 1946 he resigned his regular commission and accepted a reserve commission. After completing studies for his Masters at the University of Michigan, he became affiliated with Streeter-Ames Co, where he is Vice President and Director of Sales and Engineering.

Colonel J. D. Hittle, AUTHOR OF *The Rise of Russian Sea Power* (page 20), puts a new light on Russian naval traditions. His background of writing includes two books, *History of the Military Staff* and *Jomini's Art of War*. He has written two previous articles on

Russia for the GAZETTE, *Russia's Achilles' Heel* and *Background for Russian Action* and is currently serving as Legislative Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Major Richard M. Hunt didn't have to do much research or hire a ghost writer to prepare *The Helicopter — an Airplane not a 6 x 6* (page 30). A former editor for the Associated Press at Raleigh, NC, he became a platoon leader with the 1st Tank Bn during WWII and then put 9 years in aviation — serving in billets that led up from flight training to Assistant G-1 of the 1st MAW in Korea.



MAJ HUNT

Presently he is an instructor in the Air Section of the Marine Corps Educational Center, MCS, Quantico.

Captain T. L. Curtis (*Your Sidearm, Sir!* page 42) actively campaigns for the .45 as a personal weapon. Now an instructor in amphibious warfare in the General Subjects Section at the Basic School, Capt Curtis enlisted in the Corps in 1935. He was appointed WO in 1944 and during WWII worked with the OSS in Greece, Bulgaria, India, Burma, China and Africa. He was commissioned in 1951 and was in Korea on special assignment before going to Quantico.

LtCol Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr, Officer in Charge of the Marine Corps Recruiting Station, New York, is the author of *Leatherneck Salesmen* on page 54. LtCol Snoddy was commissioned via the ROC in 1942 at Quantico. During WWII he served with the 3d and 4th Mar Divs. He wears the Purple Heart with Gold Star, both awards received at Iwo Jima. After the war he was ordered to the Administrative School at MCS, Quantico and from there went to HQMC as Assistant Logistical Officer in Plans and Policies. After taking the Post Graduate Personnel Administration and Training Course at Northwestern University, he went back to Quantico in the Testing and Educational unit. After a year in Korea, where he was awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat V, he reported to his present assignment.



LTCOL SNODDY

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


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By Maj Verne C. Kennedy, Jr

✦ SINCE THE ONSET OF THE KOREAN War, the Marine Corps Reserve Program has become increasingly important to our national defense. The immediate effect of the war on the Reserve program was serious. However, with the passing of time, the situation is becoming well stabilized. One favorable aspect of the program since Korea has been to increase the quality of the personnel in the organized Reserve. The rate of growth of many units has been slow. On the other hand, those men participating in the program have a better concept of their responsibilities.

A primary principle required in planning an organized Reserve program is a thorough understanding of the Reservist; his feelings, his problems and his potential. This personalized consideration is far different from that required in the Regular service. Under the present laws the Reserve program is voluntary and the Reservist must be satisfied if he is to remain active. His personal needs and desires must be carefully and thoughtfully considered at all times. He is an individual and must be considered as such. At the same time military discipline must be kept at a high level and his enthusiasm for the training program must be maintained.

Summer Camp is the key to the Reserve program. The major portion of the training received by an individual Reservist is gained during this period. This fact makes it paramount to send as many men to camp as possible, to see that their

marine reserves

Regular officers on I&I duty should know the Reservist wants fair treatment and good training. But above all he wants to be treated like a Marine



training is adequate and to send them home satisfied, ready to return the following year.

Planning the summer training program is a complex and detailed operation. Best results may be achieved by studying the Reservist and his relations to camp in order that maximum benefit to him and to the Corps may be achieved. It is impossible to adapt a program to each man and every unit and to meet their particular desires and abilities. On the other hand, an analysis of the man can be of great assistance in long range planning.

What Is the Reservist?

The primary characteristic of a Reservist is the motivation which is responsible for his membership in the organized Reserve. Although no two men are identical, there are many obvious reasons why men joined the organized Reserve. Among them are:

Income Consideration: Drill pay, longevity, retirement, uniforms, etc.

Training: A desire to learn military topics, weapons, marksmanship.

Desire to be a Marine: Largely based on a desire to belong to an organization which has such a long and outstanding record.

Summer Training: A chance to travel and for new experiences.

Desire for Leadership: An opportunity to develop leadership.

Responsibility to Corps and Country: A fundamental personal sense of responsibility for national preparedness.

Personal and Social: Social, athletic, friendship, "one of the gang,"

parental pressure, personal admiration for a Marine, etc.

Of these basic motivations, the least desirable are those relating to income. Men who belong to the Marine Corps Reserve, solely because of increased income, are usually more of a liability than an asset. In a similar manner, a man in the program who is primarily interested in the summer training is probably looking for a paid vacation and may not be an asset to the camp. He will probably leave the unit after the first camp period, unless other motivations have been developed in him during the encampment.

Desire for training, leadership and the feeling of personal responsibility are motivating forces that make a good Reservist. Nearly every competent man in the organized Reserve can be identified with one or more of these categories. The men range from 17-year-olds to veterans with 30 years' experience.

The most interesting motivation is the desire to be a Marine. Here we find one of the main reasons that brings a man into the Marine Reserve Program, rather than into one of the other services. This factor is vital to the Marine program, although it must be adjusted to include other motivations if a competent Reserve is to be developed.

These factors apply to every Reserve unit in the country. They particularly affect the attendance of men at summer camp. A typical Reserve unit may consist of 30 per cent men and officers with active duty experience, 30 per cent men

who have been active in the program over one year and with at least one summer camp, and 40 per cent new men with no previous training. Of these groups, the primary drive for camp attendance must be directed at the new men. The older men may or may not attend, depending upon motivation and personal problems. They are needed as leaders, instructors and to broaden their professional knowledge. However, they are not as important to the Reserve Program as the recruit. The new man must attend camp if he is to become an adequate Reservist.

The recruit must then be our basic consideration in planning camp and encouraging attendance. He is the man who has the greatest need for camp. He is also the best recruiter for the general program. If he returns from camp satisfied and enthusiastic, he will bring his friends into the unit.

An analysis of the average recruit in the organized Marine Corps Reserve indicates his strongest motivation in the desire to be a Marine. Second, are the various income considerations, primarily, drill pay. Following these are desires to receive training and attend summer camp. In order to develop this man into an ideal Reservist, it becomes necessary to increase his desire for leadership, responsibility and to de-emphasize the financial considerations. This gradual shift in motivation is the key to a strong Reserve program.

Why Does the Reservist Go to Camp?

Having enlisted a man into an

s and summer camp



organized unit, the next objective is to get him to camp. The reasons the man goes are primarily the same as his reasons for joining the program, except that a feeling of comradeship, responsibility to his squad or platoon and a desire for promotion become very important. The greatest hazard encountered in "selling" summer camp is to emphasize the liberty or vacation aspects of the encampment. Reservists who go to camp for these reasons usually turn out to be dissatisfied and a liability at camp.

The training, leadership and so-

cial motivations are the best factors for promoting camp. The normal armory training program should be designed to create a desire for training and leadership. An active extra curricular program will greatly enhance the social and athletic aspects and develop teamwork and group integration.

As for the older men, income considerations generally become negative in their effect; that is, many men have to sacrifice money or vacation time in order to go to camp. To reduce this to a minimum, relations with employers can create a

favorable policy toward the Reserve. For the older men, this problem must be carefully worked out and developed throughout the year.

What Does the Reservist Want at Camp?

With the exception of those men brought to camp with false illusions on liberty and recreation, the Reservist wants to be treated as a Marine. He wants hard work, good training, fair treatment — but above all, to be treated as a Marine. Of course he wants liberty and recreation, but these are distinctly secondary in his desires. He definitely resents coddling, or any special restrictive policies. He also expects sufficient planning and preparation to allow him to make use of such liberty as he may rate. The young man with no prior camp experience anticipates a period of training similar to his preconceived ideas of Marine activity, based on what he has heard and read. He fully expects hard physical work, strict discipline, rigid inspections and active field training. He expects his officers and NCOs to conduct themselves competently in their various capacities. He is distinctly disappointed if either the training program or his superiors do not live up to his ideas.

The most destructive type of summer training is a program based largely on lectures, movies and indoor training. Where classes are required, it is preferable to hold them in the field. The movement from and to training areas is an important part of the training. Where possible, the movement to classes should be made on foot. The trip to camp and the first 2 days in the field make the encampment a success or a failure. The camp period must start hard and fast with strict discipline from the moment the men report for camp. A maximum effort should be made to use travel time for training. Even in air travel the *Guidebook for Marines* can be studied and classes held in functioning and nomenclature of weapons.

On the first day at camp an aggressive program is vital. Physical exercise at reveille is very valuable. Inspection of weapons, equipment and quarters should be thorough and instructive. The Reservist must learn to clean weapons and care for



his equipment and quarters. The man should be kept busy all day. By "taps" he should be ready for sleep. Liberty the first few days should be de-emphasized. Later, as the camp period settles down, weekend liberty becomes a very desirable objective. The middle of the second week at camp is generally the low point in morale and interest. This reaction must be carefully considered since it is essential to lift the man's spirit to a high point, culminating as he reaches the home armory. A beach party or other organized recreation is ideal for the final Thursday. The final day should include a program built around advanced training, demonstrations and other stimulating experiences. The door for the next year camp must be opened at this time. It is very desirable to finish the camp period with marksmanship awards, promotions and other special awards that may be made. Each man who comes home with a shooting medal or new stripe has made obvious improvement which means much to him.

The trip home should be relaxed and friendly. Great care should be taken to contact parents as to the time of arrival of their sons. The presence of parents in the armory is the high point of the return. No effort should be spared by the rear echelon to encourage parents and wives to be on hand at the time of arrival.

How Does the Reservist Conduct Himself at Camp?

The average man attending his first camp is experiencing one of the most important periods in his life. The change in many men in a two-week period is unbelievable. The

Reservist may go to camp a boy and return a man. Many boys learn to shave at camp. For the majority they learn to keep quarters clean, make bunks and dress correctly.

The experiences of a new man are difficult for a veteran to remember. The food is different, the living conditions are different, he never has enough time, he is confused and tired and he is frequently scared and homesick. This is the time experienced leaders can make a boy into a Marine; or poor leadership can ruin him. The personal problems of each man must be primary consideration of the commanding officer and unit leaders.

The physical exertion, change in food and water, fatigue and excitement lead to a fair amount of minor illness, bad feet and heat exhaustion. Again the responsibility of officers and older NCOs becomes vitally important. Nothing is as dreary to a 17-year-old as lying in an empty barracks, scared and lonesome. A competent and considerate corpsman is another strong morale factor for these men.

In this connection, it should be remembered that most men do not know how much physical and psychological strain they can stand. A man can travel on blistered and sore feet, he can work with a sick stomach or sunburn; however, if he has not experienced these problems before, he does not know how much he can endure. Careful screening at sick call is important. The strongest deterrent to malingering is the group spirit and individual competition. In a well-run unit, by the end of camp, the problem of the unfit man overworking is greater than vice versa. Leaders must be

alert to keep men from over-exercising when they are on the light duty list.

Discipline problems are rare. Those that do occur, generally are concentrated on those men with incorrect motivation. As a rule, the only problems arising are those related to late return from liberty. Fights and disturbances between different units may occur, but are almost always handled by NCOs with no official action.

Formal discipline should be utilized only as a last resort. Minor infractions should preferably be handled unofficially by the 1st sergeant or gunnery sergeant. Voluntary acceptance of a commanding officer's discipline is normally the limit of discipline required.

The question of liberty is a matter that should be carefully handled. The 17- and 18-year-old on active duty for two weeks must be handled differently than the same man in the Regular service. The Reservist will be back home soon. He does not have extended legal and medical privileges. Nothing could be more harmful to the Reserve program than to leave a man in a civilian jail or send him home with contagious disease.

Preparation for liberty should begin early. A doctor or other experienced man should talk to the men. The importance of Military Police and their relation to military personnel should be fully explained. Unit leaders can do much to discourage extremes in gambling and drinking. Great care should be taken by all leaders to arrange attractive trips and activities for the weekend liberty. In some cases it may be desirable for competent





NCOs to include new men in their plans in order to keep them out of possible trouble.

In general, we must expect the Reservist to take advantage of the chance to see new sights and places. He may be away from home for the first time. He may not know how to travel between cities by rail or bus. Hotel reservations, USO activities and other recreational activities will probably be new to him. It is desirable to brief men in detail on entertainment in the area and to give them a list of reasonable hotels, resorts and other forms of amusement.

What Impresses the Reservist?

The man attending camp for the first time is confused and somewhat lost. His initial impressions come in traveling, which frequently is farther than he has ever before experienced. New living conditions—the squaring-away process and crowded quarters will be new to him.

The mess hall is a major factor.

The food, its quantity and quality are very important. The food may be excellent in quantity and quality and yet very strange to some men.

Geographic characteristics are as important as any other. The man from the Midwest who sees the mountains of Camp Pendleton for the first time, or the man who sees the ocean at Onslow Beach for the first time, experiences something he will not forget.

From a training standpoint, nothing impresses a new man more than his great improvement on the range. The marksmanship medal he may win may mean more to him than any future decoration. The training activities involving demonstration troops, followed by actual participation by the Reservist are very important. As he watches a demonstration assault on a bunker or fight through a town, he finds it hard to imagine himself doing it. A few minutes later, when he duplicates the activity, his confidence in himself is greatly increased. The actual firing of crew-served weapons and

throwing of grenades is a tremendous experience to the Reservist. The trust and responsibility placed on him in throwing a live grenade cannot be equaled by unlimited practice grenades.

Above all, the Reservist is impressed by the immensity of the base, the number of men and the system. He should be given an opportunity to see the base, even if located at remote point from the main base.

In many cases, the opportunity to see, or preferably, be inspected by a very senior officer is most desirable. This is less important in units with senior officers attached. However, an inspection by a colonel is something to remember for a man who has only before seen a captain. Even the passage of the General's car is important to the Reservist.

Camp Problems

The "problem children" at summer camp are not the 17-year-olds attending camp for the first time, but rather some of the officers and senior NCOs. A limited number of them do not live up to their duties and responsibilities, and these few can do serious damage. A bad example set by one senior man can counteract much constructive work by all others.


In some cases, more officers and staff NCOs attend camp than actually are required. This may be an unfortunate situation and should be handled as far as possible by assigning excess personnel to IOC training, or other special training.

A far worse problem is the officer or staff NCO who comes to camp primarily for liberty. All too often these men are of little use in the field for training. It is far better to leave senior personnel behind than to have them attend as a liability.

Summary

The Reservist attending camp for the first time is impressionable. Every activity should be aimed at him. The more experienced men will profit by helping the new man. They develop leadership by guiding and directing new men. Their abilities and qualifications are improved as they assist in converting new men to full-fledged Marines. **US MC**





By Capt J. E. Forde, Jr.

THE COMMANDANT'S LETTER OF 6 April 1955 on the subject of personnel being recommended for duty as drill instructors was a big step in the right direction.

Since the Drill Instructor Course at Recruit Depot here in San Diego is one of the schools under my jurisdiction, I take this means of summarizing the course of instruction and the mission of the school for those commanding officers who are reluctant to send us their *outstanding* noncommissioned officers.

NCOs should be *volunteers* to attend this school! Too many of them have no desire to train recruits — as a result you gentlemen in the field receive an unenthusiastic basic Marine. As most of you know, the product that you receive is indicative of the drill instructor who trained that particular man. A lousy DI will give you a lousy basic Marine! An outstanding DI will give you an outstanding basic Marine! Actually, the choice is *yours*.

Starting 1 July, the Commandant of the Marine Corps assumed control over assignment of personnel for the Drill Instructors Course at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot. For years the Commandant has shown great interest in the DI courses here and at Parris Island and has tried his damndest to recruit the best NCOs in the Corps (not the "best available") for this type duty. Too few commanding officers have talked up drill instructor duty to their career NCOs. The NCO who has an avid interest in the future of the Marine Corps — and who, himself, is a true professional Marine — will find a challenging job as a drill instructor.

The DI billet is not an easy one. Twenty-four out of every 48 hours of duty are spent by the DI on his feet. He is required to know *all* of the basic subjects and be able to instruct in any of them on a moment's notice.

The mission of the Drill Instructors' Course is to train NCOs in the techniques of command, instruction and leadership. The course does *not* teach the Marine NCO his basic subjects! That is a "Command" function and the student should be proficient (at least a "7") in all those subjects prior to being recommended for assignment to the course.

The student should have the minimum required clothing, in a serviceable condition and properly fitted, as required by clothing regulations, prior to his departure from his last duty station.

The Commandant requires a GCT score in Class III (90-105) in his letter of 6 April 1955. A minimum score of 100 is most desirable.

Prospective DIs should be free of financial worries and domestic difficulties. Further, he should not have had any courts-martial or non-judicial punishments during the period of his current enlistment.

The Marine NCO who desires to have a hand in developing the Marine Corps of the future can do so at the Recruit Depots. How often have you made the statement to yourself or outwardly to others, "What are they doing at the Recruit Depots? These kids can't even, etc."

I felt that way and made those statements while a rifle company commander, then when given the opportunity to come here to Recruit

Depot, I took it. The 14 months I spent in a Recruit Training Battalion gave me an insight into the caliber of NCOs entrusted with training the Marine Corps of the future. The large majority of DIs did not desire the duty and thus did not put forth their best efforts. The products we received in the field were determined by these DIs. The DIs who volunteered for the honor of training the future Marine Corps were, without exception, outstanding, and their recruit products were stamped "Basic Marine 9900" in the true sense of the word.

I appeal to the commanding officers of all ranks to "sell" duty as drill instructors to all NCOs from corporal through technical sergeant. I include technical sergeants because I feel that the Marine Corps needs maturity on the drill field. A man who has been through the mill and has that wealth of experience behind him will give the Marine Corps a better product and, I am sure, will effect a greater percentage of reenlistments than will an immature NCO who recounts the number of days or weeks left to do on his current enlistment and who chronically complains about the injustices of service life in front of men in recruit training.

Be honest with yourselves, gentlemen; who made the biggest impression on you when you were new to the service? Either your drill instructor if you went through Boot Camp, or your platoon sergeant at the Candidates' Class or Platoon Leaders' Class.

Let's give the Marine Corps better drill instructors and through them a better future.

US MC

THE RISE OF RUSSIAN SEA POWER

By Col J. D. Hittle

THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD has developed a high sensitivity to domestic and international actions of the Soviet Union. In particular, Russian military acts and policies are the subject of exhaustive examination and evaluation by the press and government agencies. The astounding expansion of the Communist realm since the end of WWII has sensitized and alerted the United States, as well as most of the Free World, to every new development

in Soviet military policy and strategy.

Yet, in spite of this sensitivity and alertness to changes in the Russian military posture, the Free World has, in large measure, let pass unheeded what probably is the most fundamental and potentially dangerous Soviet development since WWII—the emergence of Russia as one of the great sea powers.

Viewed in terms of its strategic implications, both with respect to Russian policy and US national


security, the rise of Russian sea power may well be the most important single development in the vast and continuing East-West conflict.

The really amazing thing is not that the Kremlin has become a leading sea power, but rather that this historic development has failed to achieve the attention and generate the alarm it deserves in the Western World. The frequently heard disclaimer, "Why do we need a Navy when Russia doesn't have one?" is accurately reflective of the too prevalent ignorance of, or indifference to, the burgeoning Russian sea power that is even now upsetting basic East-West power relationships.

This rise of Russian sea power is no mere matter of speculation. It is a fact. The Soviet Union's entry into the global sea power arena has already resulted in historic power shifts. Ten years ago England was the world's first ranking sea power. The United States was second. Russia was seventh.

Today the United States is the first sea power. Russia numerically is second. England is third. Viewed in historical perspective the implications of this strategic realignment challenge the imagination.

From the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 until WWII, England ruled the seas. With WWII



England passed this sea power primacy to the United States. As long as the two greatest sea powers were the US and England, a virtual sea power monopoly (and all the global freedom of movement that the term implies) was vested with the West. Now England reverts to third place in numerical navy strength among the powers, giving way to Russia.

The impact of this revolutionary change in the world strategic picture is even now being felt. Admiral Robert B. Carney, the retiring CNO, has publicly warned that "we no longer have a monopoly on strength at sea in the Pacific."

Admiral Carney's statement assumes even greater significance when it is recalled that one of the prime reasons we went to war with Japan was that US national security could not permit our sea power primacy in the Pacific to be challenged by Japan. Great events are coming fast in the 20th Century. It is not too early to speculate on the possibility that Russia's hammer and sickle has supplanted Japan's rising sun as the challenger of US sea power domination in the Pacific basin.

The recent appearance of what was authoritatively described as a "very sizeable" Russian fleet in North European waters is a harbinger of strategic complications in the Atlantic. The fact that the Soviet Union's naval capability has been able to alter so drastically the global sea power picture in so short a time leads to the question of the strength of the Russian Navy.

Russian cruiser strength is particularly interesting. According to *Janes Fighting Ships 1954-1955*, Russia has a total of 24 modern cruisers with 6 of the *Sverdlov* class under construction. At the present time the United States has in operation about 22 cruisers of various types. England has a total of 24 cruisers. These figures disclose Russia slightly ahead of the United States in cruisers in operation. However, overall cruiser superiority for the present and at least the near future would seem to rest with the United States, which has, in addition to operational cruisers, about 53 in reserve status.

Russian destroyers total 125, of which 50 are large fleet destroyers



The Soviet Union *does* have a naval tradition to draw upon.

A century before Alfred built the first English warships, the Russians were fighting desperate sea battles

completed since WWII.

Soviet submarine strength is particularly impressive, the estimated total being 375. This is more than triple the submarine strength of the US Navy. Close to half of the Russian subs are long range types capable of attacking merchant shipping or conducting mine laying. There is much to ponder in the fact that the present Russian submarine fleet, the world's largest, is 8 times as large as Germany's at the start of WWII!

Most significant discrepancy, by US standards, exists in aircraft carriers. The Soviet Navy has, at present, no carriers. While this would appear to be a serious void in the Soviet fleet structure, the lack of carriers may well be the result of a deliberate policy rather than a planning oversight. As will be noted later, the architects of Soviet naval power may be designing the fleet for a mission that does not, in their opinion, create an imperative need for carriers. Furthermore, absence of carriers does not indicate commensurate numerical weakness in naval aircraft. Russian land-based naval aviation totals some 3,000 planes. This includes jet fighters and jet light bombers. By way of comparison, the Soviet naval air arm almost equals the total air strength of Germany at the beginning of WWII.

The actual in-being strength of the Soviet Navy is of major strategic importance. Yet, the significance of current Russian sea strength is far surpassed by the rapidity at which the present totals are being augmented by new construction. For instance, the Russian building program in cruisers and destroyers is larger than that of the combined Western navies. The extent to which Russian naval strength will increase in the next few years is indicated by the fact that the Soviet Union is believed to be engaged in a construction program capable of providing, in the next two or three years, a total of 30 cruisers, 150 destroyers and 500 submarines.

When this rapid buildup of the Soviet fleet is compared with the relatively small US naval construction program and the impending "bloc obsolescence" of major elements of our Navy, it becomes in-

creasingly apparent that, from the standpoint of numbers, present American naval supremacy is no permanent certainty. It is also clear that while the US now enjoys a significant margin of naval superiority over the Soviet Union, Russia is narrowing that margin at a perceptible and significant rate.

It is, of course, wrong to base any comparison of naval strengths solely on ships alone. As naval history has repeatedly demonstrated it is more often the *men* and not the *ships* that tip the scale of victory in combat. Consequently, any evaluation of the relative strength of Soviet and western naval power must include consideration of a nation's sea-going traditions, a prime, if intangible, attribute of sea power.

Just as the frequent assertion, "Russia has no navy," reflects an unawareness of the current facts, the oft-stated belief that "Russia has no naval traditions" reflects an unawareness of Russian history. While Russia does not have the kind of naval tradition with which England or the US are blessed, she does possess a long significant naval history

which, although it includes disasters, debacles and downright inefficiency, also includes victories and heroic acts from which a meaningful naval tradition could be derived.

Like so many things Russian, the history of the Russian Navy is not well known in this country. This is unfortunate. For the Navy, like almost all major aspects of Soviet activity, is to a large degree the product of a long historical process that was not terminated by the 1917 Revolution. The Soviet Union does not hesitate to draw on the Imperial military history for tradition and inspiration for her armed forces.

A complete review of Russian naval history is not possible within the space limitations of this article. However, a survey of the salient features of Russian naval history may be useful in providing the basis for a better understanding of the nature and role of the fast growing Russian Navy that is even now posing a new and growing threat to the security of the Free World.

Peter the Great who, more than any other individual, set Russia on its course to national greatness, is generally recognized as the founder of the Russian Navy. However, the roots of Russian naval tradition extend back to the very beginning of the Russian nation.

From the historical standpoint there is good justification for stating that the Russian Navy outdates England's fleets.

The naval historian, Fred T. Jane, emphasized the early origin of the Russian Navy by pointing out that, "A century before Alfred built the first English warships, Russians had fought desperate sea fights, and a thousand years ago the foremost sailors of the time were Russians."

There was a reason why the then youthful Russian nation should have sea-going attributes. The foundation of the Russian Empire is generally regarded as taking place in the latter 9th Century AD. There should be some significance, from the standpoint of naval history, that the early Russian state was under the rule of the Varangian kings. These Varangians who governed the nascent Russian nation were Vikings, and true to the Viking tradition, their power rested, in large measure, on their ability to dominate the vital north-



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Russian naval tradition didn't stop with the 1917 Revolution

south waterway now known as the Dnieper River. The Dnieper, long referred to as the "Varangian Road," was the water highway that dominated the early history of Russia, and which in turn was dominated by the Varangians. The Varangians who ruled early Russia were true to the warlike tradition of the Vikings. Perhaps quite appropriately, therefore, it was these Vikings who made the first contribution to Russian naval history by attacking Constantinople in 865. The 200 galley-type vessels comprising the Russian fleet successfully passed the Bosphorus and effected landings, laying waste the countryside around Constantinople.

The success was short lived, for the Byzantine Emperor, Michael III, returning hurriedly from an expedition against the Saracens, put to sea with his fleet and destroyed the invading Russians. Although ending in disaster, that first Russian naval expedition did many things. It marked the beginning of Russian naval history and it underlined the sea-faring character of the first Russian regime. The fleet was destroyed — an inauspicious start of a nation's naval history — but the Russian nation did not die, nor did its Varangian rulers weaken in their determination to conquer Constantinople.

With unflagging determination the youthful Russian nation conducted a second expedition against Constantinople in 907. This ended in a negotiated trade treaty that was observed until 941 when a new expedition, reportedly numbering over 1,000 vessels, sailed against Constantinople. The Viking tradition may have been on the side of the Russians, but the scientific advancement of that time was on the side of the Byzantines who employed Greek fire to destroy the Russian fleet. For almost 100 years Russia abstained from conducting a sea-borne attack against Constantinople. However, in 1043 another expedition was launched, and its fate was the same as its predecessor. It was destroyed by Greek fire.

This ended early Russian efforts against Constantinople. The successive attempts to capture Constantinople by sea reflected the traditional sea-faring temperament of the Varangian rulers of Russia.

Furthermore, it would appear that the rulers' sea-faring spirit began to



Vikings — founders of the Russian naval tradition

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take hold in a limited sense, for it is recorded that in the early Varangian period the Russians enjoyed a good reputation as sailors and the Byzantines employed them at a "special and very high rate of pay." One result of these early sea expeditions was that Russia, at the dawn of her history as a nation, had her attention focused on the Black Sea and the city of Constantinople. This served to set a pattern that has persisted in Russian policy to the present moment. The Black Sea has been the scene of repeated naval actions, and Russia — Imperial and Communist — has never ceased striving for Constantinople. Today, as in the days of the Varangian kings, that city on the Bosphorus is a prime objective of Russian foreign policy.

After the defeat of her fleet in 1043 Russia lapsed into a prolonged era of naval inactivity. Increasing domestic conflict and growing emphasis on land power precluded any resurgence on the sea. Then in the early 13th Century, Mongol hordes came upon Russia and she became a

dominion of the Khans. Mongol domination turned Russia away from the sea and oriented her toward the landmass of inner Asia and the East.

Russia remained under the Mongol yoke until the latter 15th Century. Upon emerging from the long era of Mongol rule, Russia gradually turned her attention westward toward Europe and the sea. European orientation renewed an interest in naval matters. This interest was a logical result of the emphasis on European affairs, for Russia could not hope to participate in European power politics unless she possessed access to the sea. Furthermore, it did not take the Russian leaders long to realize that the long estrangement from the sea had placed Russia in an unenviable position in respect to Western sea power. Russia, upon emancipation from the Mongols, possessed no navy. More importantly, she was virtually devoid of nautical skills so utterly indispensable to any naval program.

The first step to rectify this vital shortcoming was taken by Michael, first of the new Romanov dynasty that was destined to rule Russia until the 1917 Revolution. At this early date, the period of 1620-40, England was the world's greatest sea power. Then, as now, Russian leadership was not slow to utilize the technical knowledge of the Western World. Accordingly, Michael imported British shipwrights and put them to work at Archangel, then the only Russian port for European trade.

The reconstruction of Russian sea power slowly gained impetus.

After Michael, during the reign of the able Tsar Alexis, father of Peter the Great, Russian policy was consciously and firmly oriented toward the dual objectives of a Baltic outlet and the creation of a fleet. This was the contribution of Alexis' great minister, Ordyn-Nashchakin, whom Russian historians recognize as one of the only real statesman-ministers of the Imperial era. In setting the Baltic policy, and emphasizing the need for a fleet, Ordyn-Nashchakin fashioned the beginnings of the program that was to be so vigorously pursued by Peter the Great.

To Peter the Great must be accorded full credit for creating Russian naval power. To appreciate his obstacles and his accomplishment it is necessary to recall the strategic position of Russia when Peter came to power: the Baltic was virtually a Swedish lake. In the south, the Black Sea was completely dominated by the Turkish fleets. With the exception of the arctic port of Archangel, Russia was land-locked, sealed off from the sea.

Initially, Peter turned his attention toward the Turks, the traditional enemies of the earlier Varangian kings. Seeking the historic Russian goal of open water in the south, Peter, in 1695, initiated a campaign against the Turkish fortress of Azov, on the lower Don. This expedition gave Peter an early lesson in sea power, for he discovered that although he could command the land approaches, he could not capture the fortress as long as the Turks enjoyed control of the sea, by which Azov was supported and supplied. Sensing the futility of his efforts, he withdrew. React-



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Peter I — A window on the sea

ing with his customary vigor, he procured European naval technicians and soon launched a naval construction program on the banks of the Don. Then, with his hastily built flotilla of nearly 200 craft, he gained control of the sea approaches to Azov, blockaded it, and took it by combined action of his forces in the following year.

While it would be incorrect to draw too strong a conclusion from Peter's Azov campaign, it is worth noting that from his first naval operation there seems to emerge the genesis of a basic concept that even today constitutes the salient doctrinal concept of Soviet naval thinking: that a prime purpose of naval power is to protect the sea flank of

land forces and assist those forces in taking the land objectives. That was precisely the manner in which Peter, the founder of the Russian Navy, used his first naval force. As will be noted later, the basic operational mission of the Soviet fleet is to serve as an auxiliary of her land forces.

Convinced that Russia must become a leading naval power, Peter, traveling incognito, departed on his famous tour of Europe. In the course of his tour of Europe he visited and closely studied shipbuilding techniques in British and Dutch ports.

Returning to Russia, he turned his attention to the Baltic, then controlled by Swedish sea power. Peter realized full well that he would have to subdue the Swedish fleet to control the Baltic — no small task for a Russia which by Western European standards did not even possess a navy. Her naval craft were primarily of the galley-type for use in coastal or inland waters.

There probably is no greater testament to the genius of Peter than the manner in which he created and used Russian sea power in the titanic struggle with Sweden for control of the Baltic and its littoral.

At the outset of hostilities, Peter's army suffered at Narva (19 November 1700) a crushing defeat at the hands of Charles XII of Sweden. Undismayed by disasters, Peter began rebuilding his army, and at the same time was aggressively pushing naval construction. Naval combat began on a small scale in 1702 with a Swedish victory over a Russian

Peter in Holland — he was not reluctant to import what he needed

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flotilla consisting of 4-gun galleys and large row boats. Peter, however, persisted in his policy, and by 1703, through shrewd employment of his now growing naval forces he gained control of Lake Ladoga and the Neva River. In that same year he founded, on the banks of the Neva, the city of St. Petersburg. This was to be Russia's "window to the west." It was also to be the base of Peter's new sea power. There, under direction of imported naval architects, he began construction of sea-going naval ships.

One of the prime ingredients of naval power which Peter lacked was Russian naval design and shipbuilding knowledge. Peter was not reluctant to import that which he needed. Consequently, he secured in Western Europe, principally from England, the naval architects and shipwrights to provide the kind of indispensable technical knowledge that simply did not exist in Russia at that time.

Among the first brought to Russia by Peter were the British master shipbuilders Bent and Browne. Under them some of the largest ships of Peter's navy were built. Even so, the talented Peter himself had a hand in designing them, some of which mounted up to 54 guns. By obtaining the services of trained British ship designers and builders, he utilized British nautical knowledge as the technical foundation for the navy he knew was so utterly necessary to the accomplishment of his plan for making Russia a great power.

Russia of Peter's time was almost as destitute of naval commanders as it was of naval builders. Not only did Peter have to import foreigners to build his ships, but he also had to import a large number of high-ranking officers to command them. Many of the imported officers did not distinguish themselves in the Russian service. This, of course, is understandable, for many of them were available for Russian employment as a result of dismissal from their former commands. For good reason, Peter the Great must have on occasion questioned even his own policy of recruiting foreign and principally British and Scotch naval commanders. A British captain lost his ship at Kronstadt, another grounded the *London* by faulty


navigation, for which Peter reduced him to junior lieutenant in the galley fleet. Others were courtmartialled, but even so, there were many foreigners who rendered able service.

Admiral Fedor Apraksin (1671-1728), the "first Russian Admiral" and the one person to whom Peter would subordinate himself, emerges as the one professionally competent Russian fleet commander of Peter's era. His ability is reflected in the fact that he was the only Russian admiral of his time praised by the British. A member of the old nobility, he seems to have possessed high professional ability and strong attributes of leadership.

In addition, he was a man of independent mind, and is reported to have frequently differed violently with Peter on naval matters. Yet, he was devoted to the Tsar, who valued his candidness. Certainly, not the least of his accomplishments was his ability to exert some control over the undisciplined foreign officers in the Russian fleet. It was Apraksin who directed the capture of Viborg in 1710 and who directed operations along the Finnish coast in 1713. He commanded the Russian fleet that defeated the Swedes at Gangoot in 1714. Five years later he conducted the naval campaign against the Swedish coast, an expedition that included major landings and hastened the final capitulation of Sweden. Unquestionably, Adm Apraksin had set a high standard for those who were to follow him in the Russian Navy. But, as history shows, Russia provided far too few admirals who measured up to the example set by Apraksin.

It was not mere accident that the success of Peter's Baltic policy was paralleled by the rising power of the Russian fleet.

In 1709 Peter crushed the army of Charles XII in the Battle of Poltava. From this point on, Swedish and Russian sea power played an increasingly more important role in the Baltic struggle. In May of 1713, Peter began his campaign for the northern littoral of the Baltic. In command of the Russian fleet was Apraksin. Peter the Great designated himself as second in command, officially listing himself, not as Tsar, but as a rear admiral. The campaign proceeded successfully




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St. Petersburg: new seapower



Sovfoto

Poltava: Swedes driven out



Bettmann

Gangoot: Peter swept the Baltic

and the Russians soon were in control of southern Finland.

By 1714 the Russian fleet, with Peter aboard, gained a signal victory over the Swedish fleet at Hango-Udd. Peter was so satisfied with the action that, in announcing the victory, he promoted himself to vice admiral.

By this time the Russian Navy had achieved respectable size, even by Western European standards. Jane states that in 1715 the Russians had thirty 80-gun ships in Baltic waters.

A dramatic page in Russian naval history was written in May of 1719 when five 50-gun ships engaged a force of Sweden's Baltic fleet. The running sea battle ended in a Russian victory when the largest Swedish ship, a 48-gun two-decker, was forced to strike. This was probably the first Russian victory in a sea battle in which only large Russian ships were engaged. Previous battles had included galleys and other smaller vessels.

Peter continued to apply his sea power relentlessly and astutely. Between 1719 and 1721 Russia conducted three major campaigns against the Swedish coast. It was evident that the Russian fleet dominated the Baltic. Sweden sued for peace, which was concluded at Nystadt in 1721. In slightly over two decades Peter, starting from virtually zero, had built a fleet that converted the Baltic from a Swedish to a Russian lake. Unquestionably, seizure of the Baltic by Peter amounts to one of the most amazing one-man achievements in the history of sea power. A nation such as Soviet Russia, possessing demonstrated propaganda abilities, should be able to discover considerable naval tradition in the sea power policy and naval actions of the Petrine period.

There were, however, aspects of Peter the Great's navy that Soviet propagandists would not emphasize. For instance, Peter realized he did not have seasoned crews such as manned British or even Swedish ships. Consequently, he issued a standing order that his ships would not engage the Swedes unless the Russians were one-third stronger. Considering the caliber of his captains and crews, such an order established Peter as one of the great realists of his time.



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Catherine: the Navy, her scepter

No events of major import characterized Russian naval history from the death of Peter the Great (1725) to the beginning of the reign of Catherine the Great (1760).

Catherine, like Peter, realized that participation in European power politics required naval power. With good reason it can be said that she guided Russia to a position of power and prestige it never before enjoyed. In so doing she continued the strong sea power policies of Peter. In a sense, the reign of Catherine the Great gave substance to the theory that Russian emphasis on naval power was—and is—an indicator of the vigor and strength of a Russian foreign policy.

Because Catherine was the beneficiary of a naval system created by Peter, she was able to bring the Russian Navy to a greater position of efficiency and effectiveness. In so doing she followed Peter's policy of employing foreign naval officers. In this she enjoyed far better results than did Peter. The same problems existed in Catherine's navy, but to a far lesser extent.

Some foreign officers of the Russian Navy, under Catherine's rule, deserve a high place among the makers of Russian naval history. The extent of Catherine's reliance on foreign trained naval officers was illustrated by the fact that at one time more than half of her entire list of naval officers were of Anglo-Saxon and Celtic nationality. From the standpoint of higher naval commanders, the navy of Catherine the Great, like that of Peter the Great, was a British product. However, the list of foreign officers in the Russian

Navy was not limited to the British. It included other Europeans, and also an American, John Paul Jones.

After the American Revolution, Jones, destined to be one of the great and revered figures of US naval history, entered the Russian service as a rear admiral. His enthusiasm soon gave way to disenchantment as he was incessantly frustrated by duplicity and intrigue. In spite of such handicaps he demonstrated his professional ability in playing the principal naval command role in the Russian victory over the Turks at Kinburn.

At virtually the outset of her reign, Catherine used her navy to support her foreign policy. She declared war against Turkey in 1768 and in 1769 Orlov's Baltic fleet was ordered to the Mediterranean, an historic development in Russian naval history. This marked the first time the Russian fleet was to push out of the Baltic into the Atlantic and southern waters. The very thought of Russian sea power in their midst filled the Mediterranean powers with apprehension; and for good reason. For centuries European-Mediterranean policy had been directed toward keeping Russian sea power from flooding out of the Black Sea through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus into the Mediterranean world. Under Catherine, control of the Baltic meant access to the high seas. Thus, through sea power, Russia was able to reach the Mediterranean world, long the objective of Russian policy, via Gibraltar rather than through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

The climax of Russian fleet operations in the Mediterranean came in July of 1770 when Russian ships, under Adm Spiridov, engaged and almost destroyed the Turkish fleet in the Bay of Tchesma. Although Spiridov was in nominal command, the scheme of action was that of RAdm Elphinstone, a British officer in Russian service. After Tchesma Elphinstone proceeded to blockade the Dardanelles. This in itself was an event worthy of historical note, for, by use of sea power's mobility, Russia was actually approaching the Straits from the west!

Russia was then on the threshold of seizing Constantinople, her historic objective. Elphinstone urged Admiral Orlov, in command of that



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Tchesma — had victory been exploited, history might have changed

portion of the fleet, to exploit the opportunity by forcing the Dardanelles, which at the time were protected only by deteriorated fortifications. At this moment of history a strange event was indeed transpiring: a Russian fleet was threatening Constantinople from the west; the Straits were virtually undefended; a British admiral — of all people — was urging that the Russian fleet attack; Orlov, the Russian admiral in command, hesitated, doubtful — and wrongfully so — that the defenses were as impotent as Elphinstone contended. While Orlov hesitated, the Turks whitewashed the old forts. Thus, when Orlov arrived to make his reconnaissance, he saw what seemed to be new fortifications. Before Orlov realized his error, the Turks, under the French engineer, De Tott, constructed new and effective forts, which were able to repulse a limited attack by Orlov. After this half-hearted effort he abandoned the Dardanelles, and sailed westward toward the island of Lemnos. So ended a crucial moment of history when Russian sea power could probably have had Constantinople for the taking.

Speculating on the "ifs" of history is at best a dubious procedure. Yet, one is tempted to imagine how history would have been changed if Orlov had not rejected Elphinstone's advice, and if at that critical moment the Turks had not whitewashed the tumbledown forts. By such a combination of hesitation and whitewash Russia, in 1770, was thwarted from her historic goal and a momentous change in the course of history was avoided.

Indecisive action between the two fleets continued. Orlov's landing at Lemnos was thrown back by a bold

Turkish counter-landing. This was followed by a hard-fought battle at Mouderos, with both fleets claiming victory.

Although Russia missed her moment of historic opportunity as Orlov hesitated at the Straits, the Russian effort in the Mediterranean was not meaningless. It had forced a diversion of Turkish forces on the southern Russian frontier, thus assisting the Russian land offensive in the Crimea. Unquestionably, Russian sea power made a major contribution to the Empire's gains which were confirmed by the Russian-Turkish Peace of Kainardji, in 1784.

In 1788 Catherine, pressing a strong Baltic policy, declared war against Sweden. Major hostilities began when the Swedish fleet, aimed at St. Petersburg, entered the Gulf of Finland. The Russian fleet (including 108-gun vessels), engaged the Swedish force at Hogland and turned the enemy back short of St. Petersburg.

This and subsequent action was but a prelude to the fierce battle that began off Revel on 3 June 1790. This was no small meeting engagement. The principal elements of the Russian and Swedish navies in the Baltic were to be involved before it ended.

Prince Carl of Sweden (21 ships, up to 74 guns, plus frigates) met Kruse's Kronstadt division of the Russian fleet (17 ships, up to 108 guns) off Revel. A bitter all-day battle ensued, and the next day Adm Tshitshagov with 13 ships and 11 frigates joined up, forcing the Swedes to withdraw to Viborg. There the Russians blockaded the Swedish fleet for almost a month.

Short on supplies, the Swedish fleet attempted to run the blockade.


A rough and confused engagement resulted in Russian destruction of the bulk of the Swedish ships-of-the-line. So decisive was this Russian victory that Jane described it as being the equivalent to a Trafalgar of the Baltic, assuring Russia primacy in that highly strategic inland sea.

When Catherine died in 1796 Russian sea power had again become a potent force in European affairs. According to Jane, Russia "was then the second naval power in the world." Coming from a naval historian of the stature of Fred T. Jane, such an evaluation cannot be taken lightly. Furthermore, such a statement has meaning in terms of today's events.

Today Communist Russia is employing sea power for much the same reasons as did Imperial Russia under Peter and Catherine the Great: control of the Baltic, pressure against the Turks in the Black Sea. Yet, both Catherine and the current Communist rulers surpassed Peter in naval policy matters by utilizing Russian sea power as a symbol of Russian power in foreign waters. Catherine pushed her fleet out of the Baltic through the Atlantic and into the Mediterranean. Today, Soviet sea power, with its growing merchant fleet and increasing number of cruisers, submarines and destroyers is no longer bound to the Baltic and Black Seas, but is intent on showing the Soviet Russian flag in the ports of the world.

This presently increasing Soviet Navy, as the Russian successor to the Imperial Navy, can point to some meaningful Russian naval history written by the fleets of Catherine the Great. Past victories are the prime ingredients of any nation's naval traditions. Catherine's navy had its reverses and its inefficiency, but it also had its victories. Tchesma and Viborg were important Imperial bequests to the naval tradition of Russia. Proof that Communist Russia recognizes and exploits the tradition passed down from the Imperial Navy of Catherine the Great is readily apparent: the victory at Viborg is today being perpetuated by Soviet Russia's leaders who have given that name to a coastal defense ship of the Russian Navy. US MC

(To be concluded next month)



By TSgt Don Kelly

THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS ARE spent each year on golf courses, swimming pools, athletic equipment, bowling alleys, pool tables and many other devices designed to give Marines recreation and make them better pool players, hackers and all-around sportsmen.

But wars are not won by these particular talents. They are won by unshaven, tired gravel crunchers who shoot straight and make every shot count in a fire fight with the enemy. And what provisions are made to encourage the individual Marine to make a pastime and hobby of his profession as a rifleman? Sadly enough, very few!

True, most posts have small-bore ranges but they are usually restricted to unit small-bore team personnel, or the hours they are open are inconvenient for most personnel. In addition, Marines must usually furnish their own equipment or they find what little gear that is available is monopolized by shooting teams.

In effect, the one sport and ability that all Marines have in common—the one that is the most beneficial to them and the Corps—is the one that they cannot indulge in unless they are already experts or pay 25 cents for 3 shots in a penny arcade.

The deplorable part of this situ-

ation is that every Marine has at his fingertips the equipment and knowledge necessary to pursue this worthwhile pastime.

He has his weapon. He is trained in its use. He has the finest ranges located either on or near his post. And most important of all, he is already endowed with a pride in his ability as a marksman and has the desire to better himself in this field.

Yet in most cases, with the exception of 2 weeks a year when he fires for requalification—and then under restricted conditions—this potential enthusiasm is almost completely stifled through lack of the opportunity to make full use of available facilities.

There is no reason for this condition to exist. The only thing necessary is to turn these facilities loose to the point where they can be utilized by the personnel.

Post Special Services sections could operate the ranges on non-firing days on the same basis as they do skeet ranges, charging standard prices for ammunition and a service charge for the use of the range. The service charge would be used for paying trained personnel, hired from the rifle range detachment to act as line officials and assure that all safety regulations are followed.

Butt personnel might be hired on the same basis as pin boys for the post bowling alleys, or personnel who utilize the ranges could exchange target duties with their shooting partners. A paid official could also be present in the butts to assure safety.



The one sport all Marines have in common — the one most beneficial to them and the Corps — is the one they cannot indulge in unless they pay 25c for 3 shots at a penny arcade

Firing order could be handled in a manner such as this:

The day is Saturday — firing is open on "A" range from 1200 to 1630.

1200-1300 ... firing on 200-yard line.

1300-1330 ... police range and move to 300-yard line.

1330-1430 ... fire from 300-yard line.

1430-1500 ... police range and move to 500-yard line.

1500-1600 ... fire from 500-yard line.

1600-1630 ... police line, butts and secure range.

Rapid fire could be handled in either one of two ways. Individual shooters could shoot rapid fire during the entire hour period, timing themselves with stop watches made available on an issue or rent basis at the range office, or the last 20 minutes of each shooting period could be set aside for rapid fire.

Now that it is evident that the

operation would take no major reconstruction of range facilities or operation, consider the advantages of such a system, other than the obvious morale factor, to the Marine Corps, Marines and the recreation program.

The main value to the Corps is immediately obvious. That of providing a better, more complete voluntary training program for the men. It is an unquestionable fact that the caliber of the Marine shooters would be definitely improved. In addition, the number of man-hours and amount of ammunition necessary for requalification of Marines should be considerably reduced.

Imagine the astonishment and gratitude of a range coach if one of his shooters reported to the firing line with his rifle already zeroed in, assumed a good position and fired rapid fire with proper timing, all the while handling his weapon as an old familiar friend rather than a casual acquaintance met only during parades and company inspections.

Increase in interest in shooting as a regular sport would be noticed among younger Marines who, at the present time, have little opportunity to sharpen their techniques to the point where they are able to try out for matches.

With the rapid advance being made in the quality of rifle shooters in other branches of the service and in foreign nations, the Marine Corps could well use a larger field of competitors from which to choose their top teams.

The economic factor is one that should definitely not be overlooked. Marines would be glad to pay their own way for the privilege of having such a service right at hand. This then would result in no cost to the taxpayer. Their increased ability and familiarity with their rifle and


shooting techniques would save ammunition and training time when they came up each year for requalification.

Another point on the credit side of the ledger is the value of such a program as training for Marines in combat efficiency. The accuracy of Marine fire has been the turning point in many a battle and the capabilities of each individual Marine as a marksman would be exploited more completely if he were given an opportunity to fire more often.

Finally, value to the individual Marine should not be ignored. The policy of keeping a Marine and his weapon working together as partners is good only so long as a man's weapon is not a stranger to him. If he knows its capabilities and knows how to keep up his end of the bargain, he is fully prepared to carry his share of the load in combat. Proper knowledge and habitual familiarity with his rifle's sights and mechanics might someday prevent his first shot in combat from becoming his last.

Everything within reason is being done to increase the Marines' efficiency as riflemen except the most important thing. They have been properly trained, they are allowed to keep the same weapon as long as practicable, so finish the job ... let 'em shoot!

US MC





The Helicopter —

By Major R. M. Hunt

IF THE HELICOPTER IS TO PERFORM successfully the ambitious combat role planned for it by the Marine Corps, it must be regarded as an airplane and not as the latest evolutionary successor to the horse or amphibious landing craft.

Current thinking indicates that Marine Corps amphibious operations of the future will be conducted by vertical envelopment. Suitable helicopters for that purpose are still in the development stage. Tactics are either classified or are still being formulated and Helicopter Assault Force command relationships have not yet been clearly delineated.

Regardless of the problems, there should be no question nor indecision concerning control of rotor-driven aircraft. The helicopter is a tactical airplane. If its use is not to be restricted by darkness or adverse weather, and if the lives of the troops it is carrying are to be of primary concern, its pilot must be a competent, fully qualified Naval Aviator. Correspondingly, for most efficient use, the helicopter must remain under operational control of the Marine Aircraft Wing, except in unusual circumstances.

Korea affords an excellent example of "unusual circumstances." The last 2 years of that conflict re-

sulted in a static situation in which the headquarters of the 1st Mar Air Wing and the 1st MarDiv were geographically separated by more than 200 miles. It was both expedient and efficient to place Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 under the operational control of the Division. Action by the Division during this period was restricted to a comparatively small area, and helicopter operations consisted largely of medical evacuations, administrative transport of troops, cargo and liaison missions. Even in this situation logistics problems were magnified, and a study of squadron records indicates that approximately 7 per cent of the flights resulted in a misuse of helicopters as aerial taxicabs.

Korea was the first occasion in which helicopters were used in actual combat. Accordingly, many officers accept the methods by which they were employed there as standing operating procedure. Such a tendency is not surprising, but it denotes a lack of understanding of the actual capabilities and limitations of rotor-driven aircraft.

It is unlikely that Korea will be typical of future Marine Corps combat operations. Projected concepts of amphibious warfare envisage

utilization of a closely integrated fighting unit of air and ground elements welded into a potent single weapons system, termed the "Air-Ground Task Force." Reliance will be placed on mobility, heavy firepower and concentration at carefully selected objectives. In the above concept, the mobility will be provided by the Helicopter Assault Force. Control of the aircraft in such operations will be all important.

The major concern of the ground force commander in any operation in which helicopters are involved is to have aircraft available when and where they are needed. Many officers have used this premise to advocate that helicopter squadrons or groups be placed under operational control of the divisions. Some have gone to the extent of suggesting that designated numbers of aircraft be organically attached to ground units down to, and including, the company level. The latter recommendation would result in no control and would spread the aircraft so thin that no organization could be adequately served. Furthermore, such piecemeal distribution would negate two of the most valuable capabilities of rotor-driven aircraft—to provide mobility and the ability to concentrate effective fighting forces when and where the ground commander needs them.

Helicopters, as airplanes, require skilled maintenance and established logistical support. The Marine Aircraft Wing benefits from the elaborate and effective Navy supply system, which contains more than 50,000 separate items of aviation spare parts and equipment. If helicopters are to be utilized in large numbers,

an Airplane not a 6x6

as contemplated, maintenance and supply will become increasingly important. Rotor-driven aircraft have more component parts and are more complicated than the average piston driven aircraft. Accordingly, only by taking advantage of the logistical and servicing facilities of the Marine Aircraft Wing would helicopter units be able to attain maximum aircraft availability.

Marine Aviation is a tactical air arm. In its role as a partner in the Air-Ground Task Force, it conducts 3 types of operations: counter-air, interdiction and direct troop support. Transport of troops, supplies and equipment by helicopter is logically a subordinate task under direct troop support, which includes such other functions as close air support, reconnaissance, artillery spotting and medical evacuation of the wounded.

Leatherneck pilots have earned an enviable reputation in their execu-

tion of direct troop support operations. In fact, Marine airmen are credited with development and refinement of dive bombing and other close air support techniques. However, the principal reason for their success in the support field is the flexible and effective aircraft control system which has been developed.

For control of support operations ashore, a Direct Air Support Center is established as geographically near the troop command post as possible. This agency, along with the Counter Air Operations Center, is a subordinate unit of the Tactical Air Control Center. The DASC contains experienced aviators, who act as controllers (together with the necessary communications and electronics equipment and personnel) to receive, analyze and comply with all requests for direct troop support.

Wherever possible, the ground commander submits requests for pre-planned close air support strikes to

the air commander as soon in advance as possible. However, it is realized that in a fluid situation, many targets materialize with little or no warning. The control system is designed specifically to cope with such situations. Adequate numbers of aircraft are held in "on call" or "on station" status and can be made available for close air support missions within a matter of minutes after a request is submitted to the DASC.

Helicopter transport operations can be handled identically. Pre-planned requests for helicopters can be submitted by the ground commander to the air commander in advance. Sufficient rotor-driven aircraft can be held in standby status to fulfill all emergency sorties. Experienced helicopter pilots are assigned to the DASC for control and analysis of requests for helicopter missions.

Because of the vulnerability of the helicopter to blast effects from atomic weapons, positive control will be required for their operations at all times. The TACC will be the only agency capable of co-ordinating atomic fires with aircraft movement. Accordingly, the DASC, as the subordinate to the TACC, will be aware at all times as to when and where helicopters may be utilized.

The helicopter is assuming a major role in future combat plans of the Marine Corps. It is an airplane and not a 6 x 6 truck. If it is to be available to the ground commander, when and where he wants it, it must be supported logistically and controlled by its parent aviation unit. The Marine Corps tactical aviation control system has proved its efficiency and effectiveness. It is logical to employ it in the control of all helicopter operations, if the Marine Corps is to obtain maximum results from rotor-driven aircraft. USMC





PRISONER

IN THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

FOREWORD

Many thousands of news stories and articles have been written since the start of the Korean war about the treatment of prisoners. Few, if any, of these articles have accurately identified the fundamental issues in the prisoner controversy or brought them squarely into focus.

The root of the trouble was the existence of two conflicting doctrines on the treatment of war prisoners. These doctrines, in turn, are associated with two different types of warfare—war between national states, on the one hand, and the so-called “class war,” on the other.

Each has its own logic and its own tradition.

That the two doctrines would clash in the armistice negotiations was inevitable, for the action in Korea involved both types of war. It was at one time a civil war, Communist style, a war between national states and yet a third type of war, war between the Universal Soviet State and a coalition of free nations fighting under the aegis of the United Nations.

From the Communist point of view, the last named is a logical progression of civil warfare as it is

practiced by the Communists. It is, if we accept the Communist view, the class war which transcends the boundaries of states. The Communists brought to the armistice conference the doctrine on the treatment of prisoners which is associated with this tradition, whereas the United Nations representatives brought their doctrine, as expressed in the Geneva Convention, which had grown out of warfare between national states. The settlement which was finally reached after more than 24 months of negotiation reflects elements of both doctrines.

ISSUE

By Col J. C. Murray




THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING the question of the treatment of war prisoners in the Korean war stems from the crossing of two types of warfare. The first type is the war between national states, which is governed by certain generally accepted rules of warfare including those on the treatment of war prisoners which find expression in the Geneva Convention. These rules for the conduct of warfare have also been observed in civil war—for example, the War Between the States. There is, however, a special category of civil war for which these rules have been rejected. On 23 August 1918, Latzis, one of the most important officials of the Cheka, published an article in *Izvestya*, with the headline—"There are no laws in civil war." He proceeded:

"In almost all periods, among almost all nations, the established customs of war were formulated in written laws. Capitalist war has its laws as stated in various conventions. Accordingly, prisoners are not shot; peace delegations have the right to immunity; there is an exchange of prisoners. . . . But when you turn to our civil war, you will see nothing of the sort. It would be ridiculous to introduce, or demand the application of, these laws which once were considered sacred. Slaughter of all who were wounded in the battle against you—that is a law of the civil war."

Latzis was speaking of the Communist revolution. It was by this type of warfare that the Communists came to power in the USSR and in Communist China.

The Communist revolution knows no code of warfare except that the end justifies the means. True to this maxim, the Communists sought in Korea to gain for themselves the advantages of both types of warfare without the disadvantages of either. They took full advantage of the unprincipled code of Communist revolution throughout the course of hostilities, but as a cessation of arms drew near they sought to settle the question of the exchange of prisoners on the basis of an unwarrantedly narrow interpretation of certain provisions of the Geneva Convention relating to repatriation. This design gradually revealed itself during the course of the armistice nego-



Signing of the Armistice—two military traditions crossed. The resulting agreement reflects elements of both systems

tiations at Panmunjom.

A principle which developed concurrently with the development of the concept of the national state was that war is a relation of state to state, rather than man to man, and the modern international rules for the treatment of prisoners of war reflect this principle. Thus, these rules take for granted the loyalty and allegiance of prisoners and they insure that this loyalty will be respected. The various codifications of these rules and the international Conventions, the latest of which is the Geneva Convention of 1949, provide that prisoners cannot be required to take up arms against their own forces or to do work contributing directly to combat operations. But while prisoners cannot be required to assist the detaining power in its military operations, neither are they expected to assist their own side. Under the Convention, then, prisoners are exempt from the fight, or *hors de combat*. Finally, the Convention anticipates that all prisoners will, as a matter of course, desire to return to their homeland following an armistice.

Such rules, which are an outgrowth of war between nations, were entirely irrelevant to the warfare by which the Communists came to power in the USSR and in China. The idea that a prisoner's allegiance to his own side should be respected would never cross the Communist mind. Neither would the idea that a prisoner should be regarded as *hors de combat*. The logic of the revolution would demand that every prisoner be exploited fully to aid in the attainment of their objectives.

Indeed, the early expression of Communist policy toward prisoners, expressed in the above quotation from *Izvestya*, has since undergone extensive refinement. Today it is a highly rationalized doctrine which is a basic element of warfare as practiced by the Communists. "The principal condition for victory," say the Field Regulations of the Red Army, "is to win the working and peasant masses of the enemy army over to the side of the proletarian revolution."

But if the Bolshevik revolution was the starting point of this new military tradition, it has found its greatest application in China. Chinese revolutionists had done political work among the military forces long before the Russian revolution. It was the revolt of a Manchu garrison at Wuchang in 1911 that touched off the series of military revolts which culminated in the establishment of the Chinese Republic under Sun Yat Sen. But on looking back, after the Russian revolution, Tung Pi-Wu, an old revolutionary, termed the 1911 affair "militaristic maneuvering." He observed that in the secret work among the troops the revolutionists had always concentrated upon the military leaders, rather than upon the common soldiers. This policy, he says, was unsound, as the military leaders usually betrayed the revolution because they had no real revolutionary understanding. To be successful, he concluded, it was necessary to lay the foundation for a people's movement. The revolution must have a mass base. The common soldier, not the leaders, should be the target of

the political work.

The views of Tung were apparently the views of the party which held its first Congress in 1921. Its policy then was a united front with the Kuomintang. Under this cloak the Communists sought to expand their influence to split the Kuomintang, and the soldiers of the Kuomintang Army were one of their principal targets. As an indication of the effectiveness of this policy, a Communist uprising took place at Nanchang in 1927 within the "Iron-sides," reputedly the best Army Corps in Kuomintang service.

Deprived of the opportunity to pursue a policy of united front with the Kuomintang after 1927, owing to the latter's recognition of the danger to it of this device, the Communists in 1930 adopted new policy lines. The Red army was to be converted from partisans to a regular workers and peasants army with a firm territorial base. Propaganda work was to be done among the soldiers of the Nationalist Army.

In 1931, the year the Japanese entered Manchuria, the first all-China Congress of Soviets met to establish a Chinese Soviet Republic. This government was based upon rural soviets, primarily in relatively inaccessible regions of Central China, but it could not hold its ground in the face of Nationalist attacks, and in the fall of 1934 the Red army began the long march which took it from Juikin in Kiangsi to Yen-an, the capital of the Communist territorial base in northwest China.

Thereafter, the Communists exploited antiforeign sentiments and the presence of the Japanese in Manchuria to neutralize the government's anti-Communist campaign.

The Communists exploited the Japanese aggression so successfully that in 1937 a new united front was negotiated. It was an uneasy alliance from which the Communists emerged with greatly increased numbers of tough troops, expert in guerrilla warfare. Perhaps more significant, they had developed a new crop of capable young leaders, both military and political.

With the surrender of the Japanese in September 1945, Mao Tse Tung's armies raced Nationalist armies for control of the occupied

areas. The Nationalists did all right in North China, but badly in Manchuria which, with Russian assistance, fell to the Communists. In early 1947 the Nationalist government had reached the zenith of its territorial expansion. But the Communists soon brought superior forces to bear at points of greatest Nationalist extension — destroying isolated bodies of troops, cutting communications and seizing arms.

With this turning of events Nationalist troops rapidly lost the will to fight. In October 1948 the defenders of Mukden, a large well equipped force, defected. Thereafter Communist victories followed each other in rapid succession. Tientsin fell 15 January 1949; Peking surrendered later that month without a fight. In April Communists crossed the Yangtze. Shanghai fell in May, and in October, Canton, Nationalist capital for the previous 6 months, fell without resistance.

The men who directed this campaign refer derisively to the Nationalist government as the "roving generals on Formosa." The implication, of course, is that the Nationalist government was unable to hold its soldiers. Working, during the period of the united front within the armies of the Kuomintang, the Communists chipped off enough to form the nucleus of their own

Wide World



Mao developed a highly rationalized program for using the POWs

armies. They continued their political work within the military forces even after the united front was dissolved. They were so successful in their political work, that when Communist and Nationalist armies turned to face each other again, the latter virtually collapsed without resistance.

This long time infiltration of the Nationalist armies by political workers did not stand alone. It was complemented, once active hostilities were begun, by a highly developed program for the handling of prisoners. They were not normally killed as has happened in China on occasion. Neither were they held as persons outside the combat, as is specified by the Geneva Convention. They were simply incorporated into the Communist forces. For some it was perhaps voluntary — for others it was involuntary. Since the prisoners were in the complete power of the captor there was actually no question of a choice. All were indoctrinated and propagandized. Additionally, selected prisoners were released at the front and sent back to their own units to describe the lenient treatment they had received at the hands of the Communists. Thus, they weakened the will of Nationalist soldiers to resist capture. Other prisoners, still more talented, were returned to their own Army to incite the defection of individuals and units.

Through these measures the strength of the Nationalist armies was sapped. This program not only reduced their will to fight; it resulted in the defection of individuals and units in ever-increasing numbers.

In Korea, likewise, circumstances were favorable for application of the Communist doctrine respecting the treatment of war prisoners.

As is well known, it was agreed between the US and the Soviet Union toward the end of WWII, that the US would accept the surrender of Japanese troops south of the 38th parallel, the Soviet Union those to the north thereof. The line had no other purpose, it being agreed that Korea was to become a free and independent nation. These facts notwithstanding, the 38th parallel immediately became a segment of the Iron Curtain.

Eventually the Republic of Korea came into being through a plebiscite. A United Nations Commission observing the election certified that it was an accurate expression of the will of the people in the areas in which the election could be observed, whereupon recognition of the government was extended by some 47 nations. Meanwhile, however, a de facto "Peoples Republic" had been created north of the 38th parallel.

This is a familiar pattern; a territorial base and a Peoples Government which claimed to be the legitimate government, not only of the area within which it exercised undisputed control, but of all Korea.

North Korean Gen Lee rationalized this claim along the following lines: "A government must have certain attributes. Among these are control over a given geographical area and the wide support of the people within that territory. If a government does not have the universal support of the people living within its territory it is not a legitimate government. If it must, for example, call upon assistance from outside sources to maintain itself in power, then it is not a proper government. It is no more than a puppet government which exploits the people of the area for the benefit of the outside power which maintains and supports it." He was talking not, as might be thought, about the "Peoples" regime, but about the Republic of Korea.

His rationalization conveniently overlooks the fact that the government headed by President Rhee has the widest support in the area south of the 38th parallel; and that a truly free election in the so-called "Peoples Republic"—the area north of the 38th parallel—would give Rhee more votes than Kim Il Sung. The latter, so far as could be determined during protracted efforts to get him to come to Panmunjom in July 1953 to sign the armistice agreement, has so little public support that he is afraid to move about without the most elaborate security measures.

Lee's rationalization also disregards the fact that foreign military assistance for the Republic of Korea came only after it had been viciously attacked by a regime which was imposed upon north Korea from with-



美國侵略者進行細菌戰的鐵證

Wide World

The big lie of germ warfare—damaging to UN prestige

out—a regime which is maintained and controlled by the USSR and Communist China; and which has converted north Korea into a province to which the pretext of sovereignty is imparted solely for the advantages this affords in the attempt to subvert the balance of Korea to the same status.

The Communist claim was based, too, upon a largely fictional election, a feature of which was the covert collection of chop marks in south Korea by resident Communists. Fictional though it was, the Communists sought on this basis to deny that residents of the area south of the 38th parallel owed the customary allegiance of a citizen to his state. In other words, the Communist regime in north Korea laid claim to the allegiance of the residents of the area south of the 38th parallel and disputed their allegiance to the Republic of Korea.

A corollary of this line of reasoning was to be advanced by the Communists in the truce talks. This was that repatriation of war prisoners must be effected on the basis of the army with which such prisoners had been identified without regard to their national allegiance. By this means the Communists sought to procure the delivery to them of some thousands of prisoners of south Korean residence who had become identified with the Communist forces, even though such identifica-

tion was accidental and involuntary, as it was in most cases.

The Geneva Convention on the Treatment of War Prisoners was revised in 1949. Thus, neither the US, Communist China nor the Communist regime of North Korea were signatories when the latter unleashed its aggression in 1950. Under these circumstances Gen MacArthur announced at the outset that the UN forces would observe the Convention. The North Korean foreign minister in response gave notice that the Peoples Army would observe the "best spirits" of that Convention. This commitment, of course, was meaningless as it left the Communists free to decide what provisions of the Convention they would observe and what provisions they would not observe, and gave the UN Command no assurance as to the treatment of its captured personnel.

Just how *did* the Communists interpret the "best spirits" of the Convention? All the details were not yet known when the prisoner issue was taken up at the armistice conference in Panmunjom in December 1951. But even then the general outline was clear.

Under the Convention, the names of prisoners are to be reported promptly after capture to a central prisoner information bureau for transmission to the interested powers. The enemy forwarded to Ge-

neva, in the fall of 1950, two lists containing a few dozen names. Thereafter they forwarded no data on the prisoners in their custody. This gave them a free hand in the treatment of prisoners.

The Convention provides that neutral benevolent societies shall be permitted to visit prison camps to verify the treatment of prisoners. The archetype of such societies is the International Committee of the Red Cross, the special status of which is specifically stated in the Convention. The Communists refused countless effort on the part of Red Cross officials to secure admission to Communist prison camps. This, too, gave them a free hand in the treatment of prisoners.

Prisoners of war, according to the Convention, are to be protected from the effects of combat action. They may not be required to do any work having a military character or purpose. No form of coercion may be used to secure information from them. Their persons and their honor are to be respected. In other words, they are individuals in the power of their captor as a result of circumstances independent of their own wills. Their allegiance to their own country is taken for granted, as is also their desire to be repatriated at the end of hostilities.

As is now well known, the Communists used coercion and force to extract information from our captured personnel. They even put into their mouths false information damaging to the prestige of the UN—the big lie of germ warfare. Worse by far, they incorporated the majority of the prisoners in the Peoples Army and used them, not only in labor of a military character, such as the construction of air fields, but in combat against their own forces. More damaging to them perhaps than exposure to the dangers of combat during hostilities, was the denial to such prisoners of the right to be repatriated following the termination of hostilities. They were barred from returning to their home places, perhaps for all time.

The Convention provides for the exchange during hostilities of the seriously sick and injured. The Communists rejected all efforts to implement this proposal until the spring of 1953 when, as an inducement

to the resumption of the armistice negotiations, they agreed to exchange sick and wounded. Their execution of the agreement left much to be desired.

A distinction must be made between the treatment of war prisoners prior to and after the entry of the Chinese "Volunteers," since the latter had a much more highly developed and sophisticated policy with respect to prisoners than did the North Koreans. Prior to the entry of the Chinese Communist forces, the treatment of prisoners was uniformly rough and ready. This was the period of death marches and mass killings. To be sure, conditions were chaotic during the first 6 months when the Red tide flowed down to the Pusan perimeter only to be pushed back to the Yalu.

The Communist troops themselves suffered from poor medical service, inadequate rations, insufficient clothing, poor living conditions and movement under arduous and trying conditions. But if they were unable to provide suitable conditions for the prisoners in their custody they should have released them under parole.

Moreover, the brutality and inhumanity which were characteristic of the treatment of prisoners during this period cannot be explained away on the grounds of limited facilities. Relatively few prisoners have survived to describe these days. The majority of ROK army soldiers who were not killed outright or allowed to die through neglect or maltreatment were incorporated into the NK forces without finesse. For all practical purposes they were given a choice between joining the Communist forces and death.

Following the entry of the Chinese, with what was now called their "traditional" policy toward war prisoners, new orders went out from the Communist General Headquarters. Prisoners were not to be needlessly killed. They were to be safeguarded and even treated leniently. Procedures were set up for their indoctrination. Some few prisoners were released at the front under conditions which actually permitted them to return to their own forces. The majority were released under conditions which gave them no practical

alternative to joining the North Korean army.

Obviously there were limitations on what could be done with non-Korean soldiers of the UN forces. While they were useful for propaganda purposes, they could not be assimilated in large numbers. This limitation did not affect prisoners of Korean nationality and, as applied to them, the "traditional" policy was not ineffective. The "awakened patriots," as the soldiers incorporated into the Communist armies were called, did not, however, prove to be too reliable. When serving with front line troops they often tried to escape to return to their own forces. They had to be closely supervised. Thus, as a general rule they had to be scattered through other formations, rather than formed into their own units. Eventually the decision was taken to move them to the rear and employ them largely as laborers.

It was against this backdrop that discussion of the prisoner of war question was opened at Panmunjom on 11 December 1951.

When the representatives of the two sides sat down at the conference table, the enemy had in his hands relatively complete information on captured personnel in the custody of United Nations forces. This was compiled from the reports submitted periodically to Geneva by the UN Command. Representatives of the UN, for their part, had from Geneva only the few dozen names referred to earlier. This placed them in a disadvantageous position.

POW atrocities—an early phase

Wide World



When in the early days of the war it became evident that the Communists were not going to observe the Geneva Convention by transmitting data on the prisoners of war in their custody, the UN Command might likewise have stopped forwarding such data. Had it done so — had it then, like the Communists, come to the conference table with a list of prisoners to be exchanged and refused to render an accounting for any additional numbers — it is possible that an agreement would have been reached on the basis of those lists alone.

It is true that the Communists would have charged us, as we have charged them, with holding back prisoners, but they would not have been placed in the position of having to acknowledge publicly that large numbers of their captured personnel were unwilling to be repatriated. Thus, the actions of the UN Command in retaining all prisoners of war in custody with a view to giving a full accounting at the termination of hostilities, and of transmitting prisoner of war data to Geneva in accordance with the Convention on War Prisoners, had made it difficult to finesse this issue.

The transmission of prisoner of war information during hostilities is primarily for the humane purpose of enabling the governments concerned to inform the relatives of prisoners of their status. Failure to forward such data causes needless anguish both to prisoners and to their friends and relatives at home. It was for this reason that the UN Command had decided to continue to transmit prisoner information to the enemy even though the latter failed to reciprocate.

Included in the data which went forward, automatically, to Geneva, however, were the names of some 50,000 ROK residents who had been taken into custody for security reasons and accorded the same treatment as POWs until their status could be verified. In time, most of these persons were correctly classified as civilian internees and the Communists so informed through Geneva. Nevertheless, on the basis of the original data the Communists were unreasonably to demand, at least initially, the delivery to them of these persons in whom they had

no legitimate interest.

Assuming that the decision to transmit POW data to the Communists was warranted by humanitarian considerations, this data on ROK citizens should not have gone forward. The fact that it did, brought needless issues in the negotiations.

Although the UN Command negotiators started the discussion without the list of prisoners which the Communists should have provided on a continuing basis to Geneva, they did have a fairly extensive collection of data compiled from other sources. These included letters from prisoners, Red propaganda broadcasts, Communist newspapers, official communiques of the Communist General Headquarters giving the numbers of prisoners who had been captured and interviews with prisoners who had escaped from the Communists or those few who had been "released at the front" under conditions which actually permitted them to make their way back to their own forces. Also pertinent was data on the numbers of soldiers missing in action, along with certain experience factors on the ratios of killed and captured which comprise this figure.

In his opening statement Gen Lee Sang Cho, speaking for the Communists, proposed without hesitation that prisoners be exchanged on an all-for-all basis without further ado. In reply, the UN Command spokesmen cited the inequity between the two sides with respect to the information exchanged. They stated that the UN Command could not even begin to appraise the problem on the basis of the data on hand, and they demanded the exchange of data as a prerequisite to talks on the exchange of the prisoners themselves.

For several days Gen Lee contended that the exchange of data was unnecessary, but he finally acceded to our demands and on 18 December lists of prisoners were traded. Lee and his cohorts had heard of the significance of the Christmas season. Their remarks indicated that they hoped that the release of the names of the prisoners at this time would bring strong pressures on the UN delegation to make such concessions in the negotiations as might be necessary to secure the


early release of the prisoners.

In the lists exchanged the UN Command reported some 132,000 prisoners, the Communists 12,000. The latter was a shocking revelation — one which put the prisoner of war problem in a new frame of reference. This was not a list of the prisoners taken; it was a list of prisoners that the Communists were prepared to repatriate at that time. The 12,000 reported was about 50,000 less than the estimated number of personnel of our side who had fallen into the power of the enemy.

Evidence adduced during the discussion and from other sources indicated that the major portion of the missing prisoners had been incorporated illegally into the Peoples' Army. This was accomplished through the previously mentioned device of "release at the front," and the system of indoctrination and training which created "liberated privates" or "awakened patriots." Lee attempted to deny this after he began to realize its possible implications as regards the negotiations, as he likewise did our charge that some of the captured personnel had been transported to Manchuria, Communist China and the USSR.

United Nations spokesmen sought in vain to secure for the missing personnel the restoration of their rights as POWs. The Communists steadfastly refused to give any accounting for the missing 50,000 and steadfastly insisted upon exchange on an all-for-all basis. In sum, what the Reds actually sought was the release and repatriation of all the POWs except about 50,000 whom they failed to list as prisoners. In addition, they sought the delivery to them, or expatriation, of those ROK nationals who had been taken into custody for security reasons by the UN Command during the hostilities and reported erroneously to Geneva as prisoners of war, but whose status had been corrected to civilian internees when investigation established that they were citizens of the Republic of Korea. The disposition of these persons was, of course, an internal affair of the Republic of Korea and no business of the Communists.

Needless to say, there was no reciprocity in the Communists' posi-



Wide World

A campaign of violence in United Nations Command Camps was directed by the Communists from the Conference table

tion with respect to this class of personnel. They did not go so far as to suggest the exchange of the thousands of North Koreans taken into custody by the Communist regime. But then who would have been so naive as to expect a Communist regime to say to its subjects, "If you don't like it here, you are free to go elsewhere."

In the meantime it had become increasingly apparent that many of the prisoners in the custody of UN forces were unwilling or afraid to return to the Communists following a truce. Some, particularly former soldiers of the Chinese Nationalist armies, dragooned first into the Peoples Army and later into the Peoples Volunteers in Korea, had taken the opportunity provided by the war to escape their Communist masters. Others had been induced to surrender by leaflets promising food, shelter, protection and kind treatment. These leaflets did not indicate a terminal date for these benefits and many of the soldiers who responded to them were not highly educated men. Their plight could not be disregarded.

The Geneva Convention does not provide for this contingency, but it does prohibit the use of force for any purpose. Therefore, in accordance with the humanitarian spirit and principles of the Geneva Convention the UN advocated that all prisoners be released, but that those who could not be repatriated without the use of force be excepted from the exchange. Associated with the principle of no forced repatriation was that of a screening of the prisoners by an impartial neutral body.

During subsequent discussions it

became evident that this latter principle was perhaps even less acceptable to the Reds than the former. They wanted all their soldiers returned. They wanted to discipline those whom they thought deserved it. They wanted to give evidence to their people at home that Communism control is all-embracing—that even escape through surrender on the battlefield is short-lived. Before their own people and the world they wanted, insofar as possible, to preserve the appearance of victory in Korea. This would be difficult unless all their soldiers were returned. But even more damaging to the Communists than the failure on the part of some of the captured personnel to return, would be a public renunciation of repatriation by Communist prisoners in a screening conducted by an impartial neutral body. This it would be difficult to explain away. Thus, a humanitarian solution which put the welfare of the prisoners first, and which was at the same time equitable as between the two sides, foundered because the only method by which it could be implemented was too inimical to the interests of the Communist leaders.

In opposing the principle of "no forced repatriation" the Communist spokesmen, who by now were fully aware of the implications of their policy of incorporating our captured personnel into their armed forces during hostilities, both denied that they had followed this practice and stated that what had happened during the hostilities had no bearing on what must be done upon their cessation. Having honored the Geneva Convention only in its breach throughout the war, the enemy now

hung his case on Article 118, which states "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities."

The question may be asked, is Art 118 a mandate upon the detaining power regardless of the attitude of the prisoner? To regard it as such would be to misinterpret the intent and purpose of the Geneva Convention. Its primary purpose is to establish the rights of prisoners and to provide for their protection. It must be interpreted in this light. To interpret it as requiring the delivery of a prisoner by force would be to violate the whole spirit of the covenant.

The Communists also referred to Art 7 which reads: "Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention." Obviously, to permit a prisoner who fears to return home to decline repatriation does not constitute an abridgement of his rights. Indeed, it can more properly be regarded as an extension of his rights, an act which is wholly consistent with the underlying spirit of the Geneva Convention.

The Communists tried to create the impression that the prisoners were being influenced or coerced into refusing to be repatriated. This is not true, of course. We should have been content if every prisoner had been eager to return home. But one may ask what if the charge were true? Had not the Communists disposed of the major portion of our captured personnel during the course of hostilities by "re-educating" them for incorporation into their armed forces? Having used 50,000 captured personnel of the UN forces during the war, they wanted all their captured personnel returned at the end of the war. Having observed a given set of rules throughout the war, they now denounced those rules. Having honored the Geneva Convention only in its breach throughout the course of hostilities, they wanted to end hostilities under the terms of the Convention, or more precisely, their own interpretation of its terms. In addition to the fact that their allegations had no basis in fact, their argument had no basis in equity.

It was at this time that the other half of the Communist policy regarding the use of war prisoners—their own personnel held by the enemy as prisoners of war—first came into evidence. The opportunity was provided by the failure of UN prison camp authorities to segregate prisoners in units of manageable size; that is, in compounds of not more than 500 men. Units of such size can be supervised and controlled; larger units cannot. The eventual result of this failure on the part of the prison camp officials was that effective control over the prisoners passed from the hands of the camp authorities to prisoner leaders.

Given the implacable animosity which existed between Communist and anti-Communist prisoners, it could be expected that this passage of control would lead to disturbances among the prisoners as they fought for control of the various compounds, and it did. Communist leaders in North Korea participated actively. They directed their campaign within the prison camps through organizers and agents who allowed themselves to be captured by UN forces in order to get access to the prisoners. This campaign was closely co-ordinated with the Communist negotiators, who incited the disturbances in the prison camps, exploited them to the utmost to embarrass the UN Command in the negotiations. By such means the Communists sought to force the UN Command to abandon its refusal to deliver up those prisoners who were opposed to repatriation.

Among the plans made by the Communists for the prisoners was a plan for a mass escape, following which the prisoners were to join Communist guerrilla units in South Korea. Although this plan was far advanced, it was never executed.

Perhaps the master stroke of the Communists in their campaign within the prison camps was the capture of the commandant of the prison and his imprisonment within one of the compounds. He was ransomed by his successor's acquiescence to terms dictated by the Reds. This lent support to Communist claims made at Panmunjom.

Unfortunately for the Communists, they overplayed their hand in this dramatic incident. The UN

Command could no longer postpone the disagreeable task of restoring the control of prison authorities over the prisoners. This was achieved through breaking up the large compounds into manageable units and through increasing the security forces. These measures did not put an end to the efforts of the Communists to exploit the prisoners in connection with the negotiations. For months they regularly protested "the death and injury of Communist prisoners of war in UN Com-

Wide World



Gen Dodd—Red POW leaders overplayed their hand when they captured the commandant

mand custody," attributing it to measures employed "to coerce the prisoners to oppose repatriation." But the restoration of control did limit the Communists to harassing tactics. The planned mass escape of nearly 100,000 fanatically-led Red soldiers was averted.

The inference that the Communists were actually less concerned about the return of all their captured personnel than they were with the appearance of it may be drawn from a negotiatory effort made by them in March and April of 1952. This involved acceptance by both sides of the principle of release and exchange of all war prisoners on the basis of revised lists. It was clearly understood that adjustments in the original lists would be made. It became a question of how extensive those adjustments would be. That is, the question became one not of principles but of numbers.

The UN spokesman stated that he could not give a firm estimate on the number of prisoners who could be repatriated without conducting a screening of the prisoners, a step which thus far had been avoided. The Communist spokesman proposed a recess until such a screening

could be conducted, and he provided a proclamation of amnesty to the prisoners to be publicized prior to the screening in order to allay their fears about returning home.

It is reasonably certain that had the results of this screening been satisfactory to the Communists an armistice would have been concluded forthwith. But the results were unsatisfactory in 2 respects. First, the number of prisoners forcibly opposing repatriation was too great! Only approximately 80,000 of a total of 116,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners and 16,000 out of 37,000 civilian internees were willing to be repatriated to, or delivered to, the Communists. Moreover, of the 20,000 Chinese prisoners included in the above figures, only about 6,000 were willing to be repatriated. This latter was the dominant factor. Willing, possibly, to wink at the numbers of Korean prisoners, the Chinese could not accept the idea that all the Chinese would not be returned to their control.

On receiving these estimates the enemy peremptorily rejected any further exploration of this avenue of approach to a solution and renewed his propaganda to the effect that the prisoners had been coerced to refuse repatriation.

During these negotiations the enemy had tacitly accepted the principle of voluntary repatriation for the civilian internees and those prisoners of war in the hands of the UN Command whose residence was south of the battle line. For the most part, these were nationals of the Republic of Korea and their disposition was properly an internal affair of that government. Nevertheless, the UN humanely sponsored the volunteer principle for these personnel. The enemy's acceptance of this principle could not be regarded as a concession inasmuch as the Communists made no offer to extend the privilege to personnel in a similar category in their custody. It could, however, be taken as an indication of a desire on the part of the Communists to resolve the prisoner issue.

But by now, an impasse had been reached—an impasse which was not to be resolved for more than a year.

US MC

(To be concluded next month.)

in brief


❖ A new, general-purpose tent featuring a lower silhouette, but affording more living space than the old squad tent, will make living under canvas in the field easier in the near future.

Developed by the Army Quartermaster Corps, it will be introduced into use as existing tents are worn out.

Featuring windows and a liner to serve as a heat-shield in summer and an insulating factor in cold weather, the new tent can be erected by 4 men in 50 minutes and can be struck in 25 minutes.

Designers deep-sixed the old flap-type entrance in favor of double curtain doors which slide on wires.

❖ Designated as an inshore fire support ship, the newly commissioned USS *Carronade* is designed to replace the LSMR-types which have been employed since WWII to give close-in fire support while amphibious troops move toward the beach. It carries the Navy designation of IFS-1.



❖ The new XF8U-1, Navy day fighter built by Chance-Vought (above) is a carrier plane designed to operate at supersonic speeds. All performance data are classified.

❖ German anti-guerrilla operations are described in Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-243. It covers operations against the guerrillas in the Balkans during the Nazi occupation from the end of hostilities against Greece and Yugoslavia in April 1941, to the capture of Belgrade by the partisans and Soviet forces in October 1944. Material was obtained from German military records.

❖ Tankers will be interested to know that development of Helmet, Combat Vehicle Crewman, T-53-2 (below) is nearing completion. The prototype helmet consists of a helmet shell with internal communications equipment. The shell is of one-piece laminated nylon construction cut to afford maximum protection and still allow unobstructed use of tank fire control equipment. It is equipped with padded earphones, a microphone on a swivel boom and a toggle-type selector switch at the point of juncture of the boom and left ear-flap—thus eliminating the chest set. Goggles are being developed for use



with the new helmet which weighs less than 3 pounds and still affords adequate bump, as well as ballistic, protection.

❖ New, reinforced plastic armorplate (above) recently approved by the Navy and Air Force makes it possible to protect larger areas on planes, vehicles and vessels from flak and small arms' fire. The new material is lightweight, it can be moulded into intricate shapes formerly impractical with metal and it is non-magnetic which opens areas to armor plating which formerly could not risk the magnetism of metal. In the test fired above, a .22 cal. bullet fired at a velocity of 2858 ft/sec would not penetrate the armor.

❖ The Heller, a combination recoilless rifle and rocket launcher has been developed in Canada for use as an anti-tank weapon. It fires a projectile that burns through heavy armor and generates such intense heat that a hit almost anywhere on a tank will have killing effect.

❖ Largest icebreaker ever built in the Free World, the USS *Glacier* (AGB 4), has been commissioned by the Navy (below). With engines rated at 21,000 horsepower, the *Glacier* will face her first polar ice this winter with "Expedition Deep Freeze." The *Glacier's* role will include breaking ice for thinner-skinned ships to penetrate Antarctic regions; providing helicopters for advance scouting; mapping coastlines and providing logistic support for aviation and construction personnel.





❧ HOW MANY TIMES HAS THE remark been made, "I can't shoot the .45—I'd make a better score, if I took the pistol apart and threw the pieces at the boppers;" or, "The .45 is no good, give me a .38 revolver." These foregoing remarks are made by people who just haven't taken the time to learn about this all-important weapon.

The Marine Corps finally got rid of the carbine, a weapon that only served the purpose of making just another rifleman out of a company officer. Too often platoon leaders and company commanders forgot their primary mission of directing their platoons and companies, and because of the range of the carbine, entered into the fire fight rather than directing it.

The weapon these company grade officers will now carry is the pistol, cal. .45, and they're going to have to learn how to get the most out of their weapon. An old saying states, "Pride in ownership." If *all* officers were required to have a .45 as a part of their equipment, we would build up a group of pistol shooters without a peer in a short time.

We are required to have swords which certainly have a ceremonial value. But our basic combat weapon is forgotten, until once a year the majority of company officers go to the range, draw a strange weapon, shoot up 160 rounds of ammo and then forget the whole thing until the next year.

If the Marine Corps could make

arrangements with Colt Patent Arms, permitting officers to purchase a pistol for less than \$50, it would be beneficial to everyone. For one thing, general interest in pistol shooting within the Corps would be revived; more officers would enter competitive shooting events and foreign competitors wouldn't be beating the Marines at their own game in international shooting.

The present allowance of ammo is 160 rounds. For familiarization it is probably sufficient, but if an allowance of 680 rounds per year were made available, an officer could get a day per month to keep his hand in; and 5 days a year at the range for qualification. The cost in ammo would be approximately \$68 but the increase in weapons efficiency could not be counted monetarily.

To further stress the importance of a .45 pistol; in Korea, officers were arriving with K-38 Masterpiece revolvers, a fine hand-gun, but ammo—"Havano." If these officers had spent \$47.20 for a .45 pistol, they not only would have had ammo available, but also there would have been fewer lost government owned pistols, ownership making a person more careful of his property.

Another solution is the issuance of a new pistol to each officer as he is commissioned, the pistol to be his for the time he serves in the Corps. As our enlisted men now have responsibility for their rifle, so should officers have responsibility for their basic weapon, the .45 caliber, hard-hitting *accurate* pistol. USMC

your side arm, Sir!

By Capt Tom Curtis

**Officers must get to know their basic
combat weapon. Drawing a strange one once
a year and firing for record is not enough**

RETIREMENT AND I

Part Three—MARINE CORPS RESERVE

By Major John McNiff

IN 1949, A YEAR BEFORE KOREA, Congress passed a law which provides that all officers, warrant officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps Reserve who, if called or ordered to active duty, or to perform active duty for training (maneuvers) or inactive duty training (drills) for any period of time, suffer disability or death in line of duty from injury while so employed, shall be deemed to have been in the active naval service during such period. That they or their beneficiaries shall be in all respects entitled to receive the same pensions, compensation, death gratuity, retirement pay, hospital benefits, pay and allowances as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the Regular Marine Corps.

The "active duty" referred to in the law means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States, other than active duty for training. "Active duty for training" would include maneuvers and any other full-time duty for training purposes. "Inactive duty training" means any of the training, instruction, duty or equivalent training performed with or without compensation by Reserve Marines under SecNav regulations. Organized Reserve drills and Volunteer Training Unit meetings are examples.

It should be noticed that this particular law covers disability or death caused by an injury as distinguished from disease. The facts in each particular case will determine what is an injury and what is a disease. A Reserve Marine who becomes disabled from a fall during a drill would seem to have sustained an "injury." On the other hand if he attended a drill and fainted due to pneumonia, which he was unaware of, any subsequent disability would not seem to be due to an injury, but rather to a disease.

A Reserve who qualifies under the law whether or not he is receiving pay when injured, will be entitled to receive full active-duty pay and allowances during the hospitalization

period together with the usual medical care and hospitalization. If the injury produces a disability of 30 per cent or more that renders him unfit to perform his duties, was not the result of intentional misconduct or willful neglect, was the proximate result of his duty or inactive duty training, and may be of a permanent nature, the Reserve's name shall be placed on the temporary disability retired list of the Marine Corps and he shall be entitled to receive disability retirement pay. Eventually a determination will be made as to whether or not his disability actually is permanent. If it is he will go to the retired list with disability retirement pay just as Regulars do. If it is not, he will resume his pre-injury status. A permanent disability of less than 30 per cent will qualify him for disability severance pay.

Disability from disease will entitle a Reserve to the benefits just described only when he has been called or ordered by the Marine Corps to extended active duty in excess of 30 days.

Marine Reserves entitled to receive basic pay who have been called or ordered to extended active duty for a period in excess of 30 days, have the same disability retirement benefits as regular Marine Corps personnel. To qualify there must be:

A. In time of war or national emergency

(1) Permanent physical disability caused by disease or injury of 30 per cent or more.

(2) Determination that disability is not a result of intentional misconduct, willful neglect, and was not incurred during unauthorized absence.

B. In time of peace

(1) and (2) same as above.

(3) Causal relation of disability to the performance of active duty, with which he need not have and without which he must have

(4) Eight years of active service.

Reserves measure years of active service by using a 360-day year. Each day of active duty equals one day in

the usual manner but a Reserve may include up to 60 days a year by adding 15 days for each year he has been a member of any recognized Armed Forces Reserve unit and one day for each drill or period of equivalent instruction performed. To determine his years of active service a Reserve adds all of these and divides by 360.

Suppose we found a Reserve, who after 20 years of active service, (using the definition of "active service" given above) suffered permanent disability of 29 per cent arising from either an injury during a drill or an injury or disease after being ordered to extended active duty in excess of 30 days. Should he be deprived of disability retirement pay merely because of such a small margin of disability? Congress thought not. In 1949 it enacted a provision whereby such a Reserve shall be retired with disability retirement pay.

So important was the Reserve program following World War II, not only in the Marine Corps but also in the other branches of the Armed Forces, that Congress felt it necessary to offer some incentive for continued participation in it. The benefits conferred to injured participants was one part of this Congressional effort, but the bulk of Reserves upon whom the success of the program depended would probably never sustain injury.

This major consideration was handled competently and generously by the 80th Congress in 1948 when it enacted what is now known as Public Law 810. Most everybody calls it a retirement law. But it is also a first-class insurance plan.

To qualify for this retirement pay the Reserve Marine officer or enlisted man need only—

(1) Perform satisfactory Federal service (as defined below) for 20 or more years.

(2) Be 60 years of age.

The retirement pay will be $2\frac{1}{2} \times$ base and longevity pay of highest rank held during entire service \times years of service.

Point System

Days	Points	Days	Points
0 — 24	0	195 — 218	8
25 — 48	1	219 — 243	9
49 — 72	2	244 — 267	10
73 — 97	3	268 — 291	11
98 — 121	4	292 — 316	12
122 — 145	5	317 — 340	13
146 — 170	6	341 — 364	14
171 — 174	7	365 — 366	15

The foregoing is the simplest possible explanation of this law. But it immediately presents questions. What is a year of satisfactory Federal service? Any 12-month period in which the Reservist acquires at least 50 points. How does a Reservist acquire points? Here's how:

(1) For each year prior to 1 July 1949 that he was in the Marine Corps Reserve or the Reserves of any other Armed Force, not including active duty, he receives 50 points.

(2) For each year of membership in the Marine Corps Reserve subsequent to 1 July 1949 he receives 15 points. This does not extend to a period of active duty, such as many Reserves had during the Korean campaign.

(3) For each day of active duty with any of the Armed Forces, including all periods of annual training duty, and all periods of attendance at certain service schools he receives one point.

(4) For each drill or period of equivalent instruction as authorized by proper authority he receives one point. The drills of Reserve units are understood by most everyone. A period of equivalent instruction is not so well understood. It can be

(a) a regularly scheduled meeting of a Volunteer Training Unit (VTU) or Electronic Warfare Unit,

(b) a part of a correspondence course at the Extension School, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.,

(c) a part of a correspondence course at the Marine Corps Institute,

(d) associated duty with units of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve or with other elements of the Marine Corps,

(e) other types of duty authorized by proper authority.

A member of an organized Reserve unit has no problem. He must at-

tend the drills or be dropped. These units have 48 drills a year and two weeks of active duty in the summer. Volunteer Reservists (those not in the organized Reserve and not on active duty) have more of a problem. They receive 15 points merely for Reserve membership but must make up the other 35 through active duty for training or through periods of instruction. If in any year the minimum of 50 points is not obtained, neither that year nor the points actually gained is counted. And by regulation, if at least 27 points are not earned in any year, the Reservist is assigned to the Inactive Status List (ISL). Those who make the list cannot be considered for promotion, cannot be credited with retirement points, and cannot be paid for voluntarily participating in any training activities for which they would ordinarily be paid. However, any previous retirement credit earned will not be lost. If a Reserve desires to get off the list he need only apply to his District Director.

Now that we have explored the meaning of a year of satisfactory Federal service, someone may want to know what happens to a Reserve who has the 20 years to his credit before he reaches 60. He can continue his Reserve activities and earn more points which as we shall see later will mean a larger retired pay. He can be discharged or resign. This cuts off longevity for pay purposes. He can apply for transfer to the inactive status list. This keeps him in the Marine Corps Reserve and sustains his longevity but he will be unable to acquire additional points, although he can be called to active duty with pay and credits toward retired pay. He can also apply for the Retired Reserve of the Marine Corps. This non-pay retired category was instituted by the Armed

Forces Reserve Act of 1952. It consists of those persons who apply for it after they are no longer obligated to serve or no longer desire to participate in training. Reservists on this list are still a part of the Reserve and may be called to active duty in a large-scale mobilization.

A feature of the Reserve career phase that follows the 20 year mark is the special disability retirement law which provides that any Reserve who shall have completed at least 20 years of satisfactory service as outlined above and who is otherwise qualified to be retired for physical disability except that his disability is less than 30 per cent may elect, in lieu of separation and disability severance pay, to be transferred to the inactive status list and be granted retired pay upon attaining the age of 60. What's the advantage? Retired pay for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service is tax exempt.

When that lucky day, the 60th birthday, rolls around the Reservist, or former Reservist, with 20 or more years of the service outlined above, is put on the Naval Reserve Retired List and is granted retired pay equal to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent \times base and longevity pay \times years of service.

What specific base and longevity pay is used? The active duty base and longevity pay which he would receive if serving, at the time retired pay starts (age 60), on active duty in the highest grade temporary or permanent, satisfactorily held by him during his entire period of service. Everyone knows his highest rank. But what longevity pay bracket for that rank is used? The only thing that stops longevity from running is a discharge or resignation. Barring such separation it runs right up to the time retired pay starts.

Will the retired pay increase as the years pass by and there is no additional active duty? No.

How are years of service measured for purposes of this retirement pay? Each of the points we have been talking about equals 1 day of service. Therefore, to compute your years of service you must review your record and add all your points. When you have a total, do not divide by 365 to find the number of years. You must divide by 360 a special kind of a year designated by Congress. Fur-

thermore, in any one year after 1 July 1949 you cannot have more than 60 points or days which are due to drills, periods of instruction and membership in the Marine Corps Reserve (15 points). If you did a whole year of active duty you can count 365 points. If you did less than a whole year of active duty after 1 July 1949 you are not permitted to take credit for the entire 15 points allowed for membership in the Marine Corps Reserve. Instead you count the days in that year which were not active duty days and credit yourself (chart, p. 44).

For a demonstration of how the

point scoring goes let us review the record of Major "M" or Master Sergeant "X." (See Case History.)

Looking at the record we see a total of 2937 days of service divided by 360 days equals 8.16 years. Assuming that Major "M" is promoted to Lieutenant Colonel by the time he reaches 60 and that his active duty basic and longevity pay at that time is \$639.60 a month he will receive $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent \times \$639.60 \times 8.16 per month or \$130.48. As it turns out \$130.48 is 20.4 per cent of \$639.60. Assuming that the above score is that of Master Sergeant "X" and that at age 60 his base and longevity pay is

\$319.80 per month his retired pay will be 20.4 per cent of \$319.80 or \$65.23 per month.

Former Regulars are not eligible for this retirement pay unless the last 8 of the necessary 20 years are spent in the Reserve. Anyone who was a Reserve on or before 15 August 1945 will not be eligible unless he performed active duty during World War I and World War II.

Under the foregoing law any Reserve who is able to qualify with 20 years composed entirely of active duty would receive $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent \times 20 years or 50 per cent base pay.

When an officer of the Reserve has completed more than 20 years of active service in the Marine Corps or the Marine Corps Reserve, including active duty for training, at least 10 years of which shall have been active commissioned service, he may upon application, in the discretion of the President, be placed upon the retired list. His retired pay will be $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of his active duty pay \times number of years of service, but not to exceed 75 per cent.

Pilots will be interested to know that in a recent ruling touching on this law the General Accounting Office held that service as a Naval Aviation Cadet in the Naval Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve was not commissioned service within the meaning of the law.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 made provision for some additional non-pay types of retirement.

Section 231 of the Act provides that any Reserve officer whose age exceeds the maximum age prescribed for his grade and classification may upon his application be transferred to the Retired Reserve.

Section 226 of the Act provides for transfer to the Retired Reserve of any Reserve who is found not physically qualified for active duty.

The Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953 extends to retired pay of Reserves. This bill will permit a member of the Marine Corps Reserve to elect to receive a reduced amount of any retired pay in order to provide an annuity payable after his death in a retired pay status to his widow, child or children.

US & MC

Case History


{ Before 1 July 1949, each year in the Reserve, not counting active } Points or Days
{ duty, earned 50 points. Each day of active duty earned one point. }

1942	USMCR	Active	3Mar - 31Dec		304
1943	USMCR	Active	1Jan - 31Dec		365
1944	USMCR	Active	1Jan - 31Dec		365
1945	USMCR	Active	1Jan - 14Nov		318
1945	USMCR	Inactive	15Nov - 31Dec	$47/365 \times 50$	6.4
1946	USMCR	Inactive	1Jan - 31Dec		50
1947	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jan - 31Dec	15 days active duty $350/365 \times 50$	15 47.9 62.9
1948	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jan - 31Dec	15 days active duty $350/365 \times 50$	15 47.9 62.9
1949	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jan - 30Jun	$182/365 \times 50$	25

{ A Reservist who joined on or before July 1, 1949 begins his year } Points or Days
{ of satisfactory service (Anniversary year) on July 1 annually. } Carried forward
1559.2

1949-	OrgReserve	1Jul - 30Jun	Drills	48	
1950	USMCR		USMCR	15	
			Maximum	63	
			Active Duty	15	
				75	75
1950-	OrgReserve	1Jul - 30Jun	Drills	48	
1951	USMCR		USMCR	15	
			Maximum	63	
			Active Duty	60	
				15	
				75	75
1951	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jul - 21Oct	Active Duty	15
			Drills	16	
			USMCR (115 days)	4	35
1951-					252
1952	USMCR	Active Duty	22Oct - 30Jun		270
1952					
1953	USMCR	Active Duty	1Jul - 27Mar		
1953	USMCR	OrgReserve	27Mar - 30Jun	Drills	8
			USMCR (95 days)	3	11
			(No Active Duty)		
1953					
1954	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jul - 30Jun	Drills	48
			USMCR	15	
			Maximum	63	
				60	60
1954-					600
1962	USMCR	OrgReserve	1Jul - 30Jun	8 yrs. \times 75 ea. yr.	
	(assumed)				2937.2

By Capt Charles B. Haslam



Why A HEAVY BARRELED RIFLE ?

☛ TO GIVE THE MARINE RIFLE squad the fire power it requires, we have armed that unit with 3 Browning Automatic Rifles. These rifles, capable of delivering a cyclic rate of 500 rounds per minute, are relatively heavy. Now, in support of concepts calling for a reduction in the rifleman's combat load, the services are experimenting with a much-discussed lightweight rifle system as a replacement for the present family. My questions are, "Is a heavy-barreled rifle a necessary part of that new system," "Is a bipod necessary?"

In the first place, why do we need a heavier barrel for an automatic rifle? Why can't we have the same rifle for the automatic rifleman that

every other Marine uses? Except, of course, with an automatic fire capability.

The stock answer to the question propounded above is, "A rifle capable of firing automatically must have a heavier barrel in order to cope with the excessive heat which is generated." What excessive heat? Certainly, the automatic rifles of today can fire in the vicinity of 700 rounds per minute, but what automatic rifleman is physically capable of operating his rifle at such a rate of fire, let alone carrying sufficient ammunition to feed it? If the rifles were belt fed the extreme cyclic rates of fire could be realized. However, this is not of the case. Each auto-

matic rifleman presently carries 12 magazines; each magazine has a capacity of 20 rounds. This is a total of 240 rounds.

The BARman is fortunate indeed if he can fire 150 rounds per minute from his rifle. He cannot fire his initial load of 240 rounds within one minute's time nor is he expected or encouraged to. Consideration must be given to the time required to change magazines after every 20 rounds which takes at least 4 seconds. Also, a good BARman adheres to the doctrine of fire discipline and does not expend his ammunition in one prolonged burst. Ordinarily he fires in short bursts from 3 to 5 rounds. This being the

case, he will expend less than 60 rounds per minute and not the maximum quantity of 500 rounds per minute. Sixty rounds per minute is considerably less than 500 rounds per minute; as a matter of fact, it is 440 rounds less. Therefore—where is the excessive heat?

The BAR will eventually give way to a new rifle. Which one it will be is not known. However, it should be pointed out that these new rifles exceed the cyclic rate of fire of the BAR by as much as 200 rounds per minute. There has been no change in the feeding method in regard to the new rifles; except that a magazine may be charged while remaining in the receiver.

A good automatic rifleman, armed with any of the new rifles, will still adhere to the doctrine of well aimed shots and not that of volume fire because, like the BARman, his ammunition load will be restricted. Fire discipline and the ability to carry only a limited quantity of ammunition will result in the automatic rifleman delivering only 60 rounds or less per minute; the same as always.

Now, in order to provide for this "high" rate of fire; namely, less than 60 rounds per minute, not 600 or 700 rounds per minute, it is believed by some that the rifle replacing the BAR should have at least a 2½ pound heavier barrel. Why? The reason advanced is, once again, "To compensate for the additional heat."

This line of reasoning in support of the principle mentioned does not follow because, when properly em-

ployed, the BAR or any new rifle to be adopted will never generate the heat required to warrant a heavier barrel. The BAR or its replacement cannot be fired at its extreme cyclic rate of fire; the rifleman, even if permitted and capable of firing 600-700 rounds per minute could not carry sufficient ammunition to support his weapon; the new concept of lighter weight for the rifleman is being unjustly violated by advocating a 3 pound heavier barrel to compensate for something that never materializes.

In discussion of the second question, we all know that the BAR is a very effective weapon, and I believe the only objection ever made in respect to it is its excessive weight. The BAR has a bipod attached to its flash hider. What purpose does that bipod serve? The answer to that is easy; it is utilized to support the 22 pounds weight of this weapon; the weight being such that it cannot be easily supported during operation as the M1 Rifle is. The BAR is heavy enough that its weight makes the piece very stable; to the extent that its operator does not control the weapon by means of its forearm.

On the other hand, any lightweight rifle, weighing in the vicinity of 10 pounds, cannot be accurately controlled by means of the bipod alone. It is so light that it will bounce up and down while firing; it is not heavy enough, as is the BAR, to maintain its own position while delivering automatic fire. Since the weight of the lightweight

rifle is relatively light, the weapon never had inherent stability; now it must be supported by its operator and he must do this by steadying the piece by means of the forearm. This means that any bipod attached to a lightweight rifle to fulfill the role of the BAR is unnecessary. The weapon's operator must still support the piece by means of the forearm and the bipod is only excessive weight.

The argument may be advanced that the bipod serves the definite purpose of permitting the rifle to be fired when its forearm becomes overheated. When this argument is advanced in respect to the BAR it makes no sense whatsoever. The BAR's forearm is very well ventilated and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition may be fired through its barrel at high rates of fire without the forearm catching on fire. Consideration must be given, also, to the fact that the operator of the BAR does not touch the forearm during firing.

When this argument is advanced concerning the lightweight rifles presently being considered it does make sense. The present forearms of the lightweight rifles are not ventilated sufficiently to dissipate the heat generated by the high rates of fire that can be realized by these weapons. The forearms catch fire at around 800 rounds rapidly fired (never done in combat). But there is no reason why this deficiency cannot be corrected. If this is done the light barrel rifle of any accepted rifle system can be given its automatic fire capability. This would eliminate the 3 pound heavier barrel and the 2.5 pound bipod, a savings of 5.5 pounds, which is certainly in line with the reduction of the rifleman's load.

When the time comes, and pray that it does not, that the automatic rifleman can, and must, deliver 600-700 or even 100 rounds per minute for extended periods of time, then a heavier barreled rifle with a bipod may be justified. Until that time comes, let us utilize the light barrel rifle of any new rifle system to its fullest extent. Give it a better forearm and its automatic fire capability. The end product will be lighter, cheaper, and its barrel will last longer than its operator in any fire fight.



USMC





CANDLE FOR

By Maj Philip N. Pierce



THE GROWING REALIZATION THAT the fighting forces of the US have degenerated into "part-time attackers" is view in many quarters with increasing alarm. We are missing a tactical bet in our failure to use the night attack, and the sooner we begin to rectify this glaring deficiency, the better off we are going to be.

Along these lines it is interesting to read what a former enemy, Gen Diestel, late commanding general of the Third Reich's 364th Infantry Division had to say on the subject. Speaking of the period following the Normandy breakthrough, he said, "We were never hurried (in our night withdrawals) because of the systematic . . . organized tactics of the Allies. . . We always knew there would be a pause at night when the enemy would regroup for the next

day's operations. *It was these hours of darkness that enabled us to retire without suffering many casualties.*"

From the general's words, it is obvious that our night tactics are more advantageous to the enemy than to ourselves. It is also a safe wager that Gen Diestel is not the only enemy commander who has taken advantage of our part-time method of attack.

The growing insistence that the night attack be moved up to high priority position on the list of accepted battlefield techniques brooks no argument. Nor can there be serious disagreement with the valid protest that the night attack is one of the most difficult in the book of tactics. The attendant difficulties of lateral control of units, the individual's psychological fear of darkness, in-



we're missing a bet not using night attacks

POWER COMBAT

ability to identify objectives and boundaries, failure to readily distinguish between friend and foe, are but a few of the knotty problems which must be solved before a night attack has a fighting chance of success.

The arguments against using the night attack can only be logically answered by solving the problems inherent in this type of maneuver. One school of thought, which seems to be rapidly gaining a host of supporters, is that the answer lies in battlefield illumination. And, if such be true, the interesting possibility presents itself that battlefield illumination may well completely revolutionize our present theories of night tactics, thus permitting the execution of operations heretofore considered profitable only during daylight hours.

Contrary to general belief, the idea of battlefield illumination is not a product of the modern mind. It has, in fact, been an accepted battlefield technique for over 2,000 years. Caesar tells us that his legions successfully used battlefield illumination in form of torches against the Gallic tribes 50 odd years before the birth of Christ.

It is generally agreed that the basis of current tactical doctrine for the night attack are the factors of stealth and secrecy, aimed primarily at the tactical advantage of surprise. The record is resplendent with prime examples of the success of properly executed night attacks. As a case in point, during the latter part of the North African campaign

the British were so successful with their night offensive actions that they adopted them as the normal method of attack. From El Alamein to Tunis every major British assault was launched during the hours of darkness.

In Holland and Germany the 104th US Infantry Division launched over 100 night attacks against limited objectives, all of which were reported to be successful.

The factors to be weighed by the commander in reaching a decision regarding the use of the night attack are many and varied. There are some good solid and logical reasons supporting both sides of the problem. Taking the affirmative side first, we find that the night attack is one method by which the commander may avoid losses which would be incurred by a daylight attack over exposed terrain. He may also decide on night operations as a method of exploiting a successful attack. Still another reason for his choice might be to deceive the enemy, causing him to hold his forces in position, or to attempt to force him to commit his reserve. And, like the daylight attack, it may well be chosen for the singular reason of obtaining key terrain for future operations. But probably the strongest reason of all is that it is the only method by which the attacking force can maintain the initiative which will otherwise be lost the moment the attacker halts his advance to dig in for the night. If for no other reason, this alone should suffice to decide the issue in the

choice of a night attack.

Hand in hand with the reason for a night attack must go a consideration of the advantages accruing from this type of attack. Darkness is a severe handicap to the effectiveness of enemy fire. It also increases the attacker's possibility of surprise. The corresponding decrease in the efficiency of the enemy's observation is an increase in the attacker's favor. And finally, the enemy is badly handicapped in the effective use of his reserve forces.

The disadvantages of the night attack, when itemized in tabular form, seem at first glance to be woefully lengthy. A little study however produces the obvious conclusion that the majority of the disadvantages can be attributed to one shortcoming—lack of control. There is little doubt that this is the largest single factor against the use of the night attack. And, since it is a matter of



battlefield illumination can permit us to operate 24 hours a day




Today—artificial moonlight

fact that all the disadvantages of a night attack are traceable to a loss of vision, there can be only one answer to the problem—use night illumination.

The modern soldier has two sources from which to choose his night illumination, pyrotechnical and electrical. Of the two, the greatest emphasis to date has been in favor of the pyrotechnical devices. Just why this is true is a little difficult to explain. Perhaps it is because the elements of pyrotechnical devices are easily adaptable to assembly in relatively small packages, which can be easily transported by the individual soldier. Yet for all the research and development that has gone into the field, science has still to create a flare for battlefield use that will emit illumination for longer than a few brief minutes. To overcome the deficiency of short burning times, such devices must be used in large quantities. Some conception of the tremendous logistical problem involved in supplying this type of illumination to a battlefield can be illustrated by the example of the 155mm howitzer illuminating shell, which is a standard battlefield illuminant. It requires 4,800 rounds of this type of shell to provide 8 hour illumination across an infantry sector 5,000 yards in width. In round figures, this amounts to 244 tons of projectiles. In addition, these projectiles require some 33 tons of propellants to project them out to their bursting point.

The remaining source of illumination is electrical in nature, in the form of searchlights. There are two types of searchlights which have been used successfully. These are the Canal Defense Light, often referred to as the "CDL," and the standard anti-aircraft searchlight.



... aid to offensive action

The success of the CDL tank as an offensive weapon during WWII is a matter of some debate. Although designed primarily as an offensive weapon, the record tends to indicate that it was chiefly used in a static role as a defensive measure.

The American version of the CDL consisted of mounting a high intensity carbon arc light in the turret of an M-3 tank. The light was mounted in the space provided by the removal of the 37-mm gun. The object behind mounting it within the turret was to provide the light with some protection from small arms fire and fragments. Another version had the light mounted on the outside of the tank, with the light source protected by a power-oscillated armored shutter. In addition to the protection offered to the light, the shutter also provided for an interrupted beam of light when desired. The maximum illumination range for the CDLs was approximately 2,500 yards. One experiment proved that the light could be used successfully to provide sufficient illumination for artillery spotting at ranges up to 2,000 yards.

Little, if any, use of the standard anti-aircraft searchlight as a source of battlefield illumination was made until 1944. Again the British deserve the credit for being the first to use the weapon. "Artificial moonlight" as the phenomenon is often

called, was successfully used in all theaters of operation during the Second World War.

The AA light is a searchlight 60 inches in diameter, using a high intensity carbon arc as a light source. When combined with a 60-inch diameter reflector, it produces a beam of light of 8 million candle power. The light is capable of con-

tinuous operation for periods up to 90 minutes, at which time the light must be extinguished to allow the installation of new carbons. The re-carboning process takes approximately 2 minutes, although highly trained operators claim that half that time is sufficient.

Searchlights made their appearances in the Korean conflict in the spring of 1951 and were used very successfully. However, they were used purely in the defensive role. It may be logically argued that from the spring of 1951 on, the action in Korea was of a defensive nature. But, the inescapable fact remains that even when the opportunities presented themselves, both in WWII and in Korea, commanders were loath to make use of artificial illumination as an aid to offensive action.

Let us briefly examine the advantages to be gained by the use of night illumination. At the outset, the use of illumination will restrict enemy movement to those areas which afford him concealment. A properly directed light will put enemy installations and personnel

WWI—direct light . . .

on the "near" side of objects, which may offer concealment into sharp relief, while friendly troops on the "far" side of masks are in shadows. Light blinds the enemy. Light provides better visibility by the users in avoiding minefields and in detecting enemy patrols. It lessens the effectiveness of enemy flares. It greatly increases the efficiency of observation posts, which, under normal circumstances, are practically useless after nightfall. Light is a tremendous aid in the emplacement of weapons at night. It speeds up the night firing of artillery by being beneficial to the ammunition handlers and loaders. It enables supply vehicles to carry out their missions much more rapidly and safely, both from the standpoint of easier driving and the task of loading and unloading the vehicles.

One great advantage of the searchlight is its use as an orienting aid for the infantry. During the attack, lights may be used to deceive the enemy as to the true point of attack and draw his attention from the proposed sector of operations. Any company commander that has had to recognize a position after dark will certainly agree that a little light would be a Godsend during that critical period. And finally the use of lights will counteract that bugaboo of all night operations—the difficulty of control.

What then are the possibilities afforded us by the tactical use of searchlights? There are two types of light that may be obtained from these light sources—direct and indirect. Indirect light can be further subdivided into diffused light and re-

flected light. Direct light, that produced by pointing the light directly at the area to be illuminated, has two serious disadvantages which come to mind immediately. The light source is exposed to the enemy and it provides an almost perfect silhouette of any friendly troops that may be above the level of the ground when the light is turned on. It is obvious that this type of light employment is restricted to very limited use.

Indirect lighting, on the other hand, offers some very interesting possibilities. Diffused indirect lighting is produced by the scattering effect of the light beam as it comes in contact with atmospheric particles. The effect is obtained by directing the beam at a low elevation above the ground. Under ideal conditions, this type of lighting will produce a brightness approximately equal to one-fourth or one-half full moonlight. Reflected light is produced by bouncing the directed light beam off low clouds. Under good conditions, this method will provide a light intensity approximately equal to full moonlight.

As in all tactics, the mossy old cliché, "it depends on the situation,"

carries its customary weight in the efficient use of searchlight illumination. Though in this case perhaps the word "conditions" should best be substituted for "situation." Ideal conditions for the maximum production of reflected light call for a solid base cloud formation between the altitudes of 500 and 5,000 feet. As the cloud base thins out, the light intensity will be reduced proportionally. Scattered clouds will create a similar pattern of light and dark patches on the ground.

Fog and ground haze will reduce the effectiveness of the light anywhere from 25 per cent to complete zero. Rain tends to over-diffuse the light beam, resulting in a reduction of visibility. A heavy down-pour will reduce light efficiency up to 75 per cent.

On the brighter side of the picture, frost increases visibility about 25 per cent to 30 per cent, while snow can logically be entered on both the credit and the debit side of the ledger. Snow covered ground increases the efficiency of the light considerably. Falling snow, conversely, reduces the beam to absolute zero.

The tactical use of searchlights can be roughly divided into two categories, battlefield illumination and rear area illumination. Although certain principles of employment are common to both uses, there is a considerable difference between the two in the final analysis. Common to both is the requirement of air superiority. Good sense dictates that both forward and rear area lights be employed in pairs, in order to provide continuous illumination. The liability of the light's lack of maneuverability has been somewhat reduced by mounting the light on a 2½-ton truck and towing the generator in tandem.



To pursue the attack—keep them in pairs



... very limited use

Terrain is probably the largest single factor in the employment of battlefield lights. If possible, the terrain should have a gentle continuous slope toward the enemy. The lights are best positioned in a saucer-like depression, comparable to that ideally selected for counter-mortar radars. Second best choice is a position slightly defiladed from the enemy. It is important that the position be defiladed from the sides, as well as to the front, in order to protect the light from flank observation. The light site must also be at a higher elevation than the area to be illuminated and approximately 2,500 to 3,000 yards in rear of the front.

In placing the light within the position, care should be taken to situate the light so that approximately the first 100 yards of the beam will be concealed from the enemy. Although the thought immediately occurs that a light thus situated would be a sitting duck for enemy mortars and artillery, actual experiments have proved that it is almost impossible to accurately locate a light in this position by either flash-range or survey methods, provided the beam elevation remains below 30 degrees. As anyone who has ever tried it will attest, eye estimation of a light source is extremely inaccurate.

It has already been pointed out that the lights are best employed in pairs. There should be a distance of 200 to 300 yards between the individual lights of each pair to provide the normal precaution of dispersion. Since, under average conditions, a single light will provide adequate illumination over an area from 800 to 1,000 yards in width and some 7,000 to 8,000 yards in depth, lights should be emplaced on the basis of one pair per 1,000 yards of front.

For maximum effectiveness the beams of the lights should be oriented parallel to each other and pointed at a 90 degree angle to the front lines, or parallel to the axis of advance. Once oriented, the beams should be moved as little as possible, since the rotation of the light about its vertical axis provides a pivotal point which is relatively easy for the enemy to fix by standard artillery observation techniques.

As to angle of beam elevation, the optimum lies between 5 and 10



FDC — too crowded for light control

degrees, just clearing the mask of the defilade. Changing atmospheric conditions will, of course, necessitate refocusing and elevation changes. Under good conditions a beam spread in the neighborhood of 4 to 5 degrees appears to give the best results. The following formula provides an easy solution to the problem of the correct elevation for maximum reflected light:

$$\frac{\text{Alt. clouds (yds)} - \text{Alt. light (yds)}}{\text{Range (yds) divided by 1,000}} = \frac{\text{Elev.}}{\text{in mills}}$$

Normal battlefield precautions, such as sandbagging or revetting the position and the provision of foxholes for the personnel, goes without saying. It is also strongly recommended that a local security group, in addition to the operating personnel, be provided to protect the position against infiltration tactics. Another highly recommended procedure is to borrow a page from artillery tactics to the extent of selecting and preparing an alternate position to which the lights can be moved and still perform their mission. Such a precaution would pay big dividends in the event of an artillery or air attack.

A factor which demands considerable serious thought is the matter of control and co-ordination. On the surface there appear to be two ready solutions to the problem. First, create a separate searchlight unit, complete with an operations section, communications section and liaison section. Two, attach the operating searchlight sections to an existing unit, such as an artillery regiment. In this latter case the necessary con-

trol and co-ordination could be accomplished from within the fire direction center.

The first solution seems to be hardly economical of personnel and communication equipment. The second solution will be received by anything but jubilant acceptance in the artillery camp. Taking both things into consideration, a modified version of the two courses of action appears most feasible.

In the first place, the artillery communications' network is generally agreed to be the most dependable to be found within the division. In addition, this communication network effectively ties together all the units of a front line division from the company to the division command post. The additional communications required to control the searchlights would, at most, total a few auxiliary wire lines, paralleled by radios, and perhaps one switchboard.

Another strong point in favor of this system is the tactical location of the lights. It is to be noted that they are emplaced at approximately the same distance behind the lines as artillery battalions. Locating the lights reasonably close to the artillery positions would still further reduce the communication requirements.

The requirement that light positions be surveyed to insure accurate location and facilitate centralized control might also be partially or totally fulfilled by artillery personnel. Artillery battalions and regiments contain survey teams who could provide the trained personnel

and equipment necessary to accomplish this task. Again, locating the lights in the vicinity of an artillery position area would considerably ease the burden all the way around.

In order to compute the angle of beam elevation for the lights, our formula indicates that one of the necessary ingredients is the altitude of the cloud cover. This is still another problem in which we can depend upon the artillery to provide the service with practically no additional effort required on their part. Artillery units are equipped with meteorology sections to provide meteorological data to their own fire direction centers, and it would be a simple matter to include one more line on their standard metro messages indicating the altitude of the cloud base.

From the personnel standpoint, the individuals who are probably best suited, by both the nature of their mission and tactical location, to adjust the lights are the artillery's forward observers. The adjustment of lights is very similar in both principle and practice to the adjustment of artillery fire. Still another artillery doctrine—that of establishing liaison with both supported and reinforced units—seems to favor this solution to the problem. There is no logical reason why the artillery liaison officers could not shoulder the additional burden of "light" liaison officers, effecting still another saving in both manpower and communications.

In so far as control, per se, is concerned, the best solution appears to be the creation of a Light Control Center, similar in function to the artillery's FDC. It would not be feasible to incorporate this control agency with the FDC, which is greatly over crowded already.

The Light Control Center appears to be an absolute necessity. There must be an agency containing the necessary personnel and equipment to convert light missions or requests into appropriate light commands. This function demands that a light control chart be maintained up to date at all times. Such vital information as the surveyed location of each searchlight position, zones of light coverage and zones of responsibility must be constantly available

in usable form. It is only through the use of the light control chart, or some similar device, that the light officer will be able to arrive at logical decisions in making his recommendations to the commander on the most efficient use of the lights. Such important factors as light positioning, dead space, maximum ranges and visibility are readily available through the use of the chart. So much for the battlefield phase.

Rear area lights present fewer problems in their employment than those emplaced in the forward areas of the zone of action. Being located much farther from the enemy's points of observation, plus the fact that they are naturally echeloned in depth, provides them with a certain amount of security not enjoyed by the forward lights. However, there are certain principles that must be observed to insure their efficient use.

In illuminating road nets, one light per 4,000 yards of depth is required. Lights should be placed in positions approximately 100 yards from the side of the road, with the beam pointed parallel to the road. Sites should be selected with the object in mind of placing the light source at a slightly higher elevation than the maximum elevation of the road. Care must be taken to screen the light close to its source in order to prevent vehicle drivers from being blinded as they approach the light. Placing the light close to a building or a clump of bushes is

one method of providing the desired light baffle.

Low angles of elevation, in the general vicinity of 2 to 3 degrees, appear to give the best results for this type of lighting. Used in conjunction with rather narrow beam widths, the lower angles of elevation materially increase the range of light intensity. At extreme ranges, the light is reflected from clouds, or atmospheric particles, while the light at shorter ranges is produced by a "spilled over" effect originating from rays that are not actually a part of the focused beam. Such light is sometimes referred to as "side light."

Test drivers, under actual field conditions, have reported that there appears to be greater road illumination as the vehicle approaches toward the light source than when the vehicle is being driven away from the light. The only explanation of better approach vision seems to be the accommodation characteristics of the human eye which react more favorably going from dark to light areas than they do going from light to dark.

These then are the ways and means by which we can successfully pursue the night attack. It has been written that "fortune favors the brave." Perhaps a word or two should also be spoken in favor of the resourceful. There are big dividends in tactical advantage awaiting the commander who uses combat candle power. US MC



Combat candlepower — big tactical dividends



have now been over 2 years on shore and I am constrained therefore to detail you to command the guard of the Frigate *John Adams*. You will proceed from this by the morning stage on Tuesday to Alexandria and thence by the packet to York where you will recruit your guard."

When orders of that type were in style recruiting was strictly on an "as needed" basis. If a new detachment was required, an officer was detailed for the command and he had to start strictly from scratch to recruit, enlist, outfit and train the detachment. Recruiting on a slightly bigger scale was carried on by the commanding officers of the larger posts but their only advertising medium was a drummer and occasionally a fifer. Incidentally, from this advertising technique came the American expression "to drum up" and in turn led to the common practice of referring to traveling sales-

The Roving Marines of the 1920s

featured ropers, jazz bands, singers and a two-reel movie

"FOR DOES NOT THE RECRUITING service sift out from the debris of humanity the very nucleus of the grain to make up the men for the service?" That rather lofty-sounding question was posed by a sergeant on recruiting duty in San Diego in 1915. Though most Marines aren't likely to use the same language that the sergeant used, he did sum up the

purpose of the recruiting service and his words are as applicable today as they were when they were first written.

Of course, the Marine Corps has not had a recruiting service for all of its 179 years. Even after the Corps was a quarter of a century old—in 1800—a set of orders similar to the following was not unusual: "You

DID HIS DUTY

No finer military organization than the Marine Corps exists in the world.
—Vernon D. Swasey
GENERAL OF THE ARMY



WILL YOU?
JOIN FOR ACTIVE SERVICE
LAND AND SEA
U.S. MARINES

Apply At
24 East 23rd Street, New York, N. Y.

men as "drummers."

In those times the "word" didn't get around very rapidly and commanding officers were not always sure whether or not they should enlist any more men. One captain wrote to the Commandant in 1802 and began his letter with this sentence:

"I should like to know if the Corps is still existing and if I have the power of enlisting Musicks as several have applied to me that are to be discharged from the English." Not only was recruiting a little uncertain but there seemed to be some question about the very fate of the entire Corps!

The recruiting necessary to supply Marine guards for the frigates authorized prior to July 1798 had been conducted with good results by the Marine officers appointed for service on board those ships, but it was not until 11 July 1798 when the act was passed reorganizing the affairs of the Marines, that recruiting began on a large and systematic scale under the direction of Headquarters then located at Philadelphia.

By the mid-1800s recruiting in New York City was described as follows:

"Yes sir, I was on recruiting duty in New York City in 1852. I was off the old *Pennsylvania*, ship of the line. There was the captain, the recruiting officer, the sergeant, my drummer and me. Along in the

By LtCol L. F. Snoddy, Jr.

morning about 10 o'clock, after the crowds would get out on the street, the drummer and I would put on our red full dress tunics, with swallow tails, form a procession and down the street we'd go. The captain bought some bright colored ribbons for the drummer and me which we tied in bows on our arms and to the buttons on the sides of our shakos and when the wind blew we certainly made a fine sight as we marched down Broadway to the Battery, then up the Bowery and back to the rendezvous on Chambers St, ribbons flying and playing quick steps all the way. Then the captain would get up on a dry goods box in front of the recruiting office and make a speech to the crowd, telling them what a fine place the Marine Corps was for a man and what a chance he would have to visit foreign ports. That's the way we got recruits in those days."


That account of recruiting in the "Old Corps" was recounted in 1915 by SgtMaj Edward Dunn, (Retired), who at that time was the oldest living Marine. When he was on recruiting duty the Corps had a strength of about 1,500 and the complete uniforms issued to recruits did not include underwear!

By 1880 a well organized, but

somewhat difficult, recruiting business was being carried on at recruiting offices in Philadelphia, New York, Boston and Mare Island. In his annual report for that year the Colonel Commandant stated that "owing to the great prosperity now existing (work being plenty) there is some difficulty in enlisting men fast enough to keep peace with the discharges."

One factor which served to make recruiting more of a problem all along was that selective recruiting was being carried on no matter how badly recruits were needed. Stress on quality was evident even in the first recruiting office at Tun Tavern when the applicant chosen for enlistment were only those who were of hardy build and were familiar with firearms and with the sea! The basic premise of seeking quality in recruits, even at the expense of quantity when quantity was required, has always been a policy—and a practice—of Marine recruiters.

An example of "quality recruiting," using unscientific methods, was described by the 1stSgt of the Norfolk Recruit Depot in 1915 in one of his monthly reports. Reporting on a rejected applicant the sergeant wrote "what he lacked in appearance and cleanliness was made up in nerve and ability to make himself at home under any circumstances that might surround him. He was immediately dubbed "Bunny" by all



the other applicants and after cutting off a fullgrown chew of the tobacco lying on the sergeant's desk, made down a bunk, took off his shoes, laid down and proceeded to munch as much as he possibly could on the said piece of plug, and at intervals ranging in length, spit big gulps of tobacco juice in his already time-honored shoes. Having finished his chew, he got up, picked up his shoe, took it to the door, emptied it and put it on. Of course this man was rejected as being undesirable for the Marine Corps."

By the first year of the 20th Century the recruiting service was pretty well organized on a nationwide basis. Best success in recruiting, however, was along the east and west coasts and around inland ports like Philadelphia and Chicago. In other inland areas, however, the Corps was not very widely known outside of the largest cities. Among "Old Corps" Marines there is the story about the recruiter in the St. Paul District in 1906 who was ordered to Deer River, Minnesota to open a station there. Upon the acceptance of his first applicant the sergeant made out a government transportation request and presented it to the local railroad ticket agent. The agent looked over the request and informed the sergeant that it would be necessary for him to buy 2 tickets.

This was a surprise to the sergeant but on questioning the agent he was informed that the rules of the road made it necessary for every corpse to be accompanied by a live person, regardless of whether it was an "ordinary corpse" or a US Marine "Corpse." The sergeant put up an argument but to no avail for the agent could read, he said, and C-O-R-P-S spelled "corpse" and "corpse" it must be to travel on that request.


About this time it became clear to Marine Corps Headquarters that something drastic was required in order to get the Marine Corps coordinated in its recruiting campaign and to present a better public relations program. What was probably the first Marine Corps Publicity Bureau was started in Chicago in 1907. Amongst most military personnel of that era, a planned publicity campaign for recruiting was regarded as decidedly unorthodox and unethical and was thought of only by those who dared to think boldly. The Bureau was located in a corner of the old South Clark Street Recruiting Office and its initial equipment consisted of one rotary mimeograph with accessories and one typewriter.


It was standard practice for the Recruiting Officer to follow through their entire enlistments the activities

of each of the men he enlisted. All posts and stations sent monthly reports to each man's place of enlistment giving information about promotions or reductions, transfers, rifle qualifications, athletic accomplishments and other such facts. Each recruiting office maintained a "follow-up book" in which each man was logged and all data on him were entered. If the information was favorable the recruiting officer wrote up a story and sent it to the newspaper in the hometown of the man concerned. These stories were published in practically every case and, of course, the recruiting officer made the most of the opportunity by including in the stories a paragraph setting forth the advantages in the Marine Corps for travel, promotion, shooting, sports and special foreign details.

The "follow-up book" had other uses too. It served as graphic proof to prospects that some of the claims made by the recruiters concerning travel and shooting were true. Additionally, the station was able to furnish information to the families and friends of the men listed in the book and this put the recruiters in a good public relations situation. Recruiting publicity in those days was in its infancy but it proved even then that good publicity is a most effective recruiting aid. The same general procedures used in the first Publicity Bureau are still used today.

One of the most effective pieces of recruiting advertising of those days—and of all times—was a booklet entitled *The Marines, in Rhyme, Prose and Cartoon*. The outer cover was decorated with a picture in color of 2 king-size Marines in winter uniforms. The first page contained a tribute to the current Commandant, MajGen Barnett. The Marine Corps Hymn was next and the remainder of the booklet was devoted to stories about the origins of such expressions as "Tell it to the Marines," a famous poem about Marines entitled "Billy Billy Blue" and several cartoons which fostered the idea that Marines were rugged and always the first to fight. The booklet was published by the Recruiting Publicity Department in New York and several printings were required to meet the public demand for copies.





Around 1900 the Corps was utilizing recruiting parties. These were groups of recruiters who were more of the traveling salesmen type though some recruiting parties did not travel about at all. The term recruiting party lasted until 1920 when Headquarters decided that such a designation caused some men to shy away who otherwise might have become candidates for enlistment. At that time the title "Roving Marines" was adopted. Now these Roving Marines were rovers who really got around and drummed up trade for recruiters. The initial show of the Roving Marines was put on in Washington on 31 January 1920. That group included two jazz bands, a roper of the Will Rogers type, some ukelele players, singers, dancers and comedians. In addition to the live show which these Marines put on, the program included a 2-reel movie with "well selected pictures and snappy titles to round out the evening." These groups had busy schedules and covered many a mile to assist the local recruiters in getting young men interested in the Corps. The Roving Marines came into great favor with a number of the biggest movie and vaudeville stars of the day and this resulted in good publicity far beyond that ever anticipated when the program was launched.

One thing that has undergone considerable change since the early days of the Recruiting Service is the system for processing and enlisting recruits. Formerly a recruiter did nothing more than send applicants to the Recruit Depot where final decision was made about their enlistment or rejection. As late as 1915 the system was that recruiters sent interested applicants to the Recruit Depots (one was at Norfolk and the

other was at San Francisco) where actual enlistment was accomplished. Usual practice was for the applicant to spend about 4 days at the Depot before he was enlisted.

The first couple of days he spent just looking around and observing the military routine and way of life. On the third day he was given a final physical examination and if he and the officer concerned were mutually satisfied the enlistment was accomplished. Using this 4-day receiving camp program, the applicant got a better idea of what he was getting into and gave Marine personnel a chance to better observe the applicant and decide whether he was a desirable man to enlist — another example of quality recruiting!

After the Recruit Depot was moved from Norfolk, Virginia to Parris Island (it was Paris Island in those days) the recruiting stations in New York, Baltimore and other such northerly places used to have considerable difficulty with "elopers." Since most travel from the northern, coastal towns to Port Royal, SC was by ship, lots of young men seized the opportunity to have the Marine Corps provide them with free transportation from New York to Port Royal. Having gotten that far they took off on their own for Florida and other southerly points without any further reference to the Corps or to the Recruit Depot. These "elopers" were problems in more ways than one since they added considerably to the recruiting budget but provided no enlistments!


Paper work involved in an enlistment was somewhat simpler many years ago too. As late as 1896 only two papers were made out on a man at the time of his enlistment. One of those papers was an enlistment record and the other was his conduct

record. Both papers followed the man throughout his every move in the Corps.

Among the military forces of the world the United States Marine Corps is an organization without peer as regards modern techniques and equipment for warfare. The combat forces are not the only ones to be so modernized, however. The Recruiting Service of today is also a well-organized, efficient and modern business organization that handles the job of keeping the Marine Corps an all-volunteer fighting force.

Marines have always been proud of their volunteer status and this hasn't changed a bit with the "new breed." Though forced to use the draft during both World Wars and again during the Korean Campaign, the Corps has in each instance returned to the volunteer system at the earliest possible time and has depended on the Recruiting Service to procure recruits as required to maintain the Corps at the levels authorized by Congress.

The acid test for the Recruiting Service came during Fiscal Year 1954 when the Commandant assigned the Recruiting Service the task of obtaining 86,000 recruits to replace the selective service and Reserve personnel whose services would be terminated during that fiscal year. Not only did the Recruiting Service attain that goal — it exceeded the quota by 7.5 per cent. Every Reserve and Recruitment District exceeded its quota and made Fiscal Year 1954 the Marine Corps' top peacetime volunteer recruiting year. The month of January 1954 was really the big one. By using "mass recruitment" of special platoons and companies, the recruiters enlisted 14,514 volunteers, 500 over the assigned quota. The success of the Recruiting Service was not an



accident—far from it. It has been the result of much planning at the top levels of HQMC and much initiative and attention to duty on the part of the officers and men who make up the Recruiting Service.

At the present time the Recruiting Service is diverting some of its activity toward direct assistance to the Organized Marine Corps Reserve program. In many places, a recruiter from the Reserve Unit or from the Inspector-Instructor Staff will be found working out of a regular recruiting substation. At other places, regular recruiters are assigned to full or part-time duty recruiting entirely for the Organized Reserve Unit. Co-operation between regular recruiters and local Reserve Units is nothing new of course, but with an "all-out" membership drive now being conducted for the Organized Reserve, recruiters are extending themselves beyond all previous limits to assist local Reserve Units in meeting and exceeding the goals set for them by the Commandant. After all, it takes both the Regular and the Reserve components to make up the big Marine Corps ball team and anything that helps one team member will certainly help the other and help the team as a whole!

Just how is the Recruiting Service set up to do its job at the present time? Basically it is organized about the same as any sales organization that sells its product on a nationwide basis and has to compete with other agencies selling the same type of product. Instead of selling automobiles, electrical appliances or sports equipment, the Recruiting Service is "selling" military service and, more important, military careers. Its competitors are the other services and civilian industries who would also like to have the same type of mentally, morally and physically qualified young men that the Corps seeks as recruits. It should be noted that educational institutions are not listed as competitors. There is a good reason for that. The Marine Corps fully realized the importance of an education to a young man whether he chooses a military or a civilian career. The Commandant's stated policy on education is that prospective recruits in the secondary schools should stay in school, be graduated and go on to college if

they can. Certainly it is easier to determine the proper military assignment for a man who has indicated his aptitude through formal schooling than for a man who can offer no reliable evidence of his interests and abilities.

Similar to big business sales organizations, the Recruiting Service has a national headquarters which does the "big-picture" planning. There are 7 district headquarters as area co-ordinators, 43 recruiting stations and some 384 substations scattered throughout the US, Hawaii and Alaska.

Continuing the comparison with big business sales organizations, the regional sales offices that encompass several states are comparable to our Reserve and Recruitment District Headquarters. At the next level are the officers in charge of recruiting stations who may be generally compared to sales managers. Finally, there are the retail stores or recruiting substations with salesmen ready to sell the product to the prospective buyers or recruits. One unique feature enjoyed by the recruiter is that if the prospect buys his product—an enlistment—he doesn't have to pay for it, he gets paid instead! Few other salesmen can offer such a feature!

In the final analysis, of course, the recruiter, the face-to-face salesman, is the man who makes or breaks the success of the recruiting service. His is the big job in the organization and he must depend on his personality, his aggressiveness and his ingenuity. He must find rent free space for his substation, negotiate a contract for storing his assigned vehicle, place window signs and car cards throughout his area, conduct direct mail campaigns, make speeches to schools and civic organizations and contact newspapers, radio and television stations.

Generally he must make himself an integral part of the community in which he is stationed. All of this and more is necessary in order for him to find out where the prospects are, seek them out, make contact with them and convince them that enlistment in the Marine Corps is the smart move for them to make. Recruiters who are really producing enlistments for the Corps are hard working men who, themselves, have

complete faith in the Marine Corps as a career.

The salesmanship approach used by today's recruiters is not a new approach. The Marine Corps was sending most recruiters through its own School of Salesmanship which was a part of the Marine Corps Institute at Quantico in 1920. Our current recruiters go to school, too, but they learn many things in addition to salesmanship. They receive instruction in all phases of enlistment procedures and administration, public speaking, typing, public information techniques, motor vehicle preventive maintenance, Marine Corps history and other such subjects which prepare them for the many and varied tasks which will befall them when they reach their assigned stations. The Recruiters' School now established at Parris Island convened its first class in 1947 and since that time has graduated more than 2,600 men and women Marines. The course lasts 6 weeks and is designed to transform "line" Marines into good salesmen by giving them a well rounded program in a concentrated course of instruction. Proof of the success of the School's efforts have been demonstrated by the achievements of the graduates.

There isn't any question about it—the business of recruiting has changed tremendously from the days of Tun Tavern to the present time. A review of available data certainly indicated that the changes have been for the best interests of the Corps and of the recruiters who have the responsibility of maintaining the Marine Corps as an all volunteer military force-in-readiness.

The same recruiter who wrote about the recruiters sifting "out from the debris of humanity the very nucleus of the grain to make up the men for the service" also wrote these words: "That the Recruiting Service, like everything else, is becoming modernized, I believe no one doubts the Recruiting Office today is looked upon as being as much of a business proposition as the clothing store, the butcher or the baker. . . . If I were asked to name the most important duties in the service, I surely would include recruiting." To the words of that "old timer," all new breed Marines might well add "Amen!" US MC

5 to 7 WEDNESDAYS and SUNDAYS

By LtCol L. E. Hudgins

IT WAS SATURDAY AFTERNOON and I was in my shorts waxing the living room floor. Mary, with a towel wrapped around her head, was feeding the baby. The place looked like the inside of a sergeant-major's seabag.

The doorbell rang.

Figuring it to be the paper boy or possibly the people next door, I made my way across the room, swung the door open and . . . oh, no! The colonel and his wife making a call.

We don't advocate the abolition of the age-old custom of calling to avoid situations like this. Until the *Navy Regulations*, Officers' Fitness Reports and the accepted rules of common courtesy are done away with, calling is here to stay. Besides, there is a certain amount of enjoyment in "calling."

Not advocating the abolition of the custom, we would, however, like to see a few changes to the rules.

The old school tells us that before making changes, we must first know the rules. All right, let's go to the source—*Navy Regulations*. We find that there is a difference between "official visit" and "call." The latter is defined in part ". . . an informal visit of courtesy requiring no special ceremonies." And looking a bit further, "Unless dispensed with by the senior, calls shall be made . . . by an officer reporting for duty, upon his commanding officer. . . . When arrivals occur after 1600, or on Sunday, or on a holiday, the required calls may be postponed until the next working day." However, we have noticed nothing concerning a call on the commanding officer at his quarters, so we must look elsewhere to find out what is proper.

In the library we thumb through stacks of quasi-official dust-catchers until we come to what is generally regarded the bible on customs in the Naval Service—*Naval Customs, Traditions and Usage* by LCdr (now

VAdm, ret) Leland P. Lovette. This explains that after a courtesy visit to the commanding officer in his office, custom requires a call on him in his quarters. But the day or time to call is not in the book.

We conclude that the time element must either be established locally or left to one's good judgment. That is just why you are apt to find yourself in the "Oh, No!" situation. At this rate you may expect visitors



anywhere from two in the afternoon to eight forty-five at night. What? Did I hear you say that you never had callers at eight forty-five? Cross your fingers that you won't.

With the rules as written (or unwritten) you should theoretically prepare the household, appropriately including the children cleanly dressed or hidden; drinks, ice, hors d'oeuvres, clean ash trays and the house sparkling. This—every afternoon of the week—callers or not. Rough on you, what? But just think of your maid-less wife!

Fortunately, we may temper this condition. We have noticed a growing tendency among general officers to have periodic receptions, which are considered a call made and repaid by those attending. However, in the less rarified atmosphere of the adjutant's office, we inquire about the commanding officer's policy. Some organizations do not have any, and yours may be one of them. The

adjutant has received no explicit instructions.

Most organizations do have a policy regarding calls. It is usually established after the arrival of the new commanding officer. He calls in the adjutant to get the latest change in the personnel situation and, as the keeper of the files turns to go, says, "What was the policy regarding calls in the outfit before I took over?"

"Well sir, Colonel Kobra never really required any officers to call on him at his quarters, but said he would always be glad to see them if they came by."

"Humm . . . well he had a good outfit, so we'll just continue that policy."

Exit adjutant with the battalion policy on calling to be passed to every officer now in, or later joining, the organization.

But this particular adjutant was a bright young officer who realized he should extend the colonel instructions. He prepared a memorandum for the commanding officer's approval. He kept a copy under the glass on the desk used by new officers reporting in when they filled out the usual forms. On this memo was the following information:

"In this battalion you are expected to make a call on the commanding officer in his quarters. A call on the executive officer is not required. If you are assigned to a section, you are expected to call on the section head. If you are assigned to a company, you are expected to make a call on the company commander unless he directs you otherwise. All calls in this battalion are made 1700 to 1900—Wednesday and Sunday only."

This idea spread to other units on the post. What a pleasure to have stipulated times for calling! Now, on Sunday afternoon as the hour of five approaches, you may be completely at ease. Everything is in readiness. The doorbell rings. Confidently you stride toward the door to welcome your callers. As you swing the door open you remember with stark terror; there isn't a drop to drink in the house.

"Good afternoon, Colonel! Good afternoon, Mrs. Smith! We were just brewing some imported Chinese tea. Would you like to try some with us?"

US MC

passing in review

BOOKS OF
INTEREST TO
OUR READERS

Tomorrow's Battlefield . . .

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES.

By LtCol F. O. Miksche. Praeger, N. Y., 1955. 218 pps. \$5.00

Forecasting both tactics and organization for armies in atomic conflict, as this book courageously undertakes, will inevitably set off a storm of controversy. Nor will Col Miksche's bluntness calm that storm. Weak points in current procedures, some generally recognized, others of original discovery, are excoriated. Cures prescribed, in the manner of military sickcall rather than bedside, include strong medicine although running the gamut from nostrums to poison.

Sample Miksche-isms: "The American-type division has a large head, too long a tail, a body not in correct proportion; can operate only against a foe weak in the air."

The regiment: "too cumbersome yet too weak to act as an independent operational unit, neither fish nor fowl."

Battalion: "is it really necessary that every lieutenant have a jeep and every battalion a whole general staff?"

Armor: "once the athlete of the battlefield has become old and clumsy. Instead of developing muscle, has put on fat."

Armies of the atomic age will, he says, be organized in 5 groupments:

1. Atomic Commands: with artillery, guided missile and air force "divisions" includes all (tactical) atomic weapon delivery systems, antiaircraft units and "tactical air power."

2. "Normal infantry divisions, the shield:" emphasizing cross country mobility, independence and capability for guerrilla operations.

3. "Mechanized Forces, the sword:" favoring brigades of lightly protected, hard hitting, mobile armor with infantry in armored personnel carriers.

4. Rear Area Commands: commanding, on an area basis, all troops in that area.

5. Paratroops: "in non-European theaters of war, large units of paratroops would still have many tasks to perform."

"The order of importance will be atomic forces, infantry, engineers (rear troops), mechanized forces, paratroops, etc."

These, and other forthright state-

ments are not set down in capsule form, but as part of a painstaking examination. The first 109 pages' historical analysis of major tactics (coincidentally exactly one half the book) are termed "necessary introduction to stimulate our researches concerning the future." If that future appears heavily dependent upon signposts of the past they honor Liddell-Hart's warning to "get out of the rut of complacency" induced by the unbroken "advance to victory" witnessed in Allied campaigns after El Alamein. 1914-1918 experiences bulk larger as "lessons" than 1943-45 although there is a disquieting tendency to lean upon Korean experience.

From the over-all aspect, an avowed intention to "analyse the future role of armies" without consideration of "strategical air warfare" confronts the author with a task as difficult as it is unrealistic. Using the device of injecting atomic weapons and jet aircraft into an imaginary recount of May 1940's decisive blitz in France and Belgium, he offers a word picture in communique style.

The outcome, exhaustion of both opponents by June 15th with stalemate in



the "tactical zone" (defined as 100 miles deep), is followed by catastrophic strategic air assault on the home cities of both sides. Thus Miksche reverses the course of Sir Winston Churchill's "broken back war" where armies futilely attempt campaigns after their countries have suffered hydrogen bomb prostration. The whole presentation is reminiscent of the two decades old Anglo-

French "defense supreme over attack" theories which did their share to pave the way for German victories.

Evidence of this fixation recurs in the stress upon problems of atomic attack. It is "not certain that absolute superiority in A-weapons would guarantee quick decision; defense is still the stronger form of war; . . . it is difficult to imagine how an attacker would cross a river if his immediate rear were to lie under heavy A-fire; . . . moving up the cumbersome conventional forces which are still indispensable for attack" will be "complicated against atomic defense."

If we inspected the coin in reverse, we would find equal discouragement for the defense. How can a river (or any other) "line" be held once the attacker has "fixed it" and delivers A-weapons upon it in quantity? Relatively light concentrations of attackers can pierce the strongest defensive positions after a thorough A-bombing.

Unquestionably two-sided atomic warfare is today's huge military question mark. Colonel Miksche's greatest contributions toward a solution lie in his strictures on rear area re-organization, on hitherto ignored refugee control, and suggestions for enhanced cross country mobility, independence and flexibility in combat organizations. Altogether they comprise a laudable approach march toward the assault on the problem of atomic tactics. There a strategic vacuum of the author's own making precludes an effective operation. By page 158 he very nearly admits the impasse: it will be "easier to concentrate A-weapons on the battlefield than troops; . . . the issue will be decided principally by air power. Ground forces, though indispensable, will play a relatively subordinate role."

Such a concept overlooks several items worth throwing into the discussion hopper before completing any estimate of the situation. First is the strictly relative nature of "concentration." (Remember "fustest with the mostest?") Secondly "cumbersome conventional forces" are not only unable to maneuver on atomic battlefields, they should never appear there. The obvious need is "unconventional" forces that are in no way "cumbersome." Organizing, equipping and operating these new type forces is, succinctly, the real problem for armies in atomic war.

If your foe cannot concentrate a regimental combat team in a position-type defense without inviting annihilation (whether he goes into "hedgehogs" or "line"), surely you can attack in sufficient strength using modernized versions of the battalion combat team.

Equally pertinent is the failure to appreciate exploitation potentials following a deluge of "A-weapons." The ancient fire-and-movement principle has not altered, only the details of its application. Is not "exploitation to destruction as 3 to 1?"

Finally, oft quoted ratios essential for successful attack apply only to local engagements. On a large front (major tactics) it can be demonstrated that the defender needs very nearly a 1:1 ratio. Granting him all the legendary, and valid, advantages of the defensive (also applicable mainly to local situations) the attacker retains the immense boon of initiative. With true mobility (another *relative factor*) an offensive force can secure a 5 or 10 to 1 superiority at any area of a several hundred mile front unless the defender's reserves are superbly served by intelligence.

If *Atomic Weapons and Armies* does not wholly solve the stupendous enigma assigned it, that is no condemnation. On the contrary, every thoughtful book by experienced military analysis should be welcomed, studied and evaluated. Each reader will discover his own nuggets and dross. My personal nugget was worth many times the effort: "In view of (atomic warfare) developments it is not unlikely that a happy union between infantry and engineers will in time produce a composite type of troops." The glow of that prospect almost dims the evil of "packaged catastrophies" sprouting their tell-tale mushroom clouds over tomorrow's field of battle.

Reviewed by Col G. C. Reinhardt

V-J plus 10 Years . . .

JAPAN'S DECISION TO SURRENDER.

By Robert J. C. Butow. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954. 233 pp. \$4.00

In the second week of July 1945, thanks to our possession of current Japanese codes, Washington had clear confirmation of the fact that Japan wanted to get out of the war. The exchange of intercepted messages between Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo and Ambassador Sato in Moscow bolstered the growing mass of evidence that a large element in the Japanese cabinet was prepared to accept, then, substantially the same terms as they subsequently did the following month. It is a great pity that we did not exploit this desire, but our Intelligence services had badly miscalculated the remaining Japanese strength and we could not believe the facts that

presented themselves. Even so, the Japanese peace party might have carried the day sooner, had it not been for the almost insurmountable obstacle we ourselves had placed in their path. This obstacle of our own devising was the announced Allied policy of unconditional surrender—an outcome of the Casablanca conference in January of 1943.

Major General J. F. C. Fuller, commenting on the Allied war aims of "unconditional surrender," observes that these two words "were to hang like a putrefying albatross around the necks of America and Britain." There can be little doubt now that the failure of the Allies to couch their war aims in carefully considered, unambiguous terms was probably the gravest single error that we made in World War II. In the case of Germany the results were, in all conscience, bad enough. Goebbels took every opportunity from that moment forward to convince the German people that there was now no alternative to "victory or Bolshevism." How well he succeeded can only be a matter of conjecture, though it's entirely reasonable to assume that he thus prolonged German resistance by many months.

In the case of Japan, however, our categorical demand for unconditional surrender was nothing short of catastrophic. The whole crux of the matter lay in the failure to include a statement of Allied intentions regarding the position of the Emperor. Of primary importance to every Japanese was the question of Japan's sovereignty: the retention of the Emperor and the perpetuation of national policy were essential.

As early as the first week in February, 1942—when Japanese fortunes were at full flood, with Singapore about to fall—Marquis Koichi Kido, Privy Seal and closest advisor to the Throne, was already thinking in terms of the day when the difference in strength between the United States and Japan would be a telling factor. As time wore on and the war began to go badly for Japan, a growing number of realistic Japanese officials became of Kido's opinion—disaster was inevitable and some way out for Japan had to be found before it was too late.

The story of that effort to find some escape from the crushing might of the American drive across the Pacific forms the theme of Robert Butow's book, *Japan's Decision to Surrender*. Mr Butow has compiled an exhaustively documented study of the intrigues and political forces in opposition that eventually led to the deck of the USS *Misouri* as she lay in Tokyo Bay one day in August of 1945.

It becomes abundantly clear in reading *Japan's Decision to Surrender* that,

had the United States chosen to follow a different diplomatic and military policy in the closing days of the war, the history of the world as we know it today might well have been changed. The evidence seems incontrovertible that well before Hiroshima and Nagasaki became fearful household words, and well before Russian troops unnecessarily invaded Manchuria and Korea, Japan wanted to end the war. The great stumbling block was the question of the definition of "unconditional surrender." Preservation of the Imperial house was the one prerequisite on which all Japanese factions were in complete agreement. Until that point was settled, the only thing possible was to fight on.

There have been a great spate of books written in the last 10 years about the inner workings of Germany and Italy during the period 1939-45. But there have been precious few—only about a half dozen—dealing with wartime Japan. Fortunately this void has now been filled. Mr Butow has contributed an authoritative, detailed study of the efforts and events within official Japanese circles that culminated in the end of the war. It is the first book dealing with this subject to appear in the English language. Scholarly and well written, though a mite tedious at times, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* is recommended for the serious reader and student.

Reviewed by Col R. McC. Tompkins

Creole Campaigner . . .

BEAUREGARD: NAPOLEON IN GRAY. By T. Harry Williams. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 345 pages. Illustrated. \$4.75

"Old Bory's coming," was the word passed through the gathering Confederate camp about Manassas in the spring of 1861. That word seemed to carry with it the promise of great victories. In the flush of the first Confederate victory, the capture of Fort Sumter, Beauregard was the rising star of the Confederate army. The dash and flair of his French background and his cavalier pomp and swagger seemed only to heighten the luster of his victory. Doubtless the fact that even his name had the same consonance and meter as that of the Great Bonaparte was not overlooked by his admirers. The rolling euphony of the name Pierre Gustaf Toutant Beauregard seemed to conjure visions of Napoleon's Old Guard and its triumphant marches.

Beauregard capped his victory at Sumter with another at Manassas, and made sure that victory was attributable to himself by asking Joe Johnston, the senior and commander, to leave the field at the height of the battle. But Beauregard never seemed to fulfill his

original promise. After Manassas he succeeded in quarreling with President Davis, Secretary Benjamin and even with Lee. From Manassas he was transferred to the Western theater, and then to Charleston, leaving behind a trail of grandiose schemes, inflamed tempers and frustrated plans.

The author has dissected the life and career of Gen P. G. T. Beauregard with scholarly care and precision. He reaches behind the facade of pomp and glitter that surrounded Beauregard in an attempt to find the real man, the Beauregard who was gloomy, introspective and jealous of his personal honor, whose pride was more dear to him than the cause he served. The author skillfully recreates many of the illuminating highlights of Beauregard's career. There is the young Lieutenant Beauregard as an engineer attached to Scott's staff in the Mexican War. Beauregard planned and started the reconnaissance to find a route around the Mexican army at Cerro Gordo, and then fell ill. Lee got the credit by completing the reconnaissance and finding the route that enabled Scott to turn the Mexican's flank. Beauregard sulked and nursed the fancied grievance. There is Beauregard ready to fight a duel with shotguns at 20 paces to avenge a fancied affront to his honor, and Beauregard trying to collect pay from the Federal Government for his travel between New York and New Orleans after he had resigned his commission to fight for the Confederacy. And there is Beauregard, just before Shiloh, propped up in bed writing the order of march with a model copy of Napoleon's order for the Battle of Waterloo before him.

Napoleon was his inspiration. Beauregard held the methods and patterns of Napoleon and Jomini as sacred dogma. He followed them assiduously. Concentration and mass were his two cardinal military principles. Yet, like many soldiers before and since, Beauregard had trouble reconciling the ideal and theoretical with the real and practical. He was at his best on the defense when all his grandeloquent phrases and plans escaped him and he got his teeth firmly set in the immediate problems of battle. The defense of Charleston, an excellent example of defense against amphibious attack, and the defense of Petersburg showed him at his best, possibly because his training as an engineer was better used on the defense.

T. Harry Williams, professor of history at Louisiana State University, has made a fine contribution to Civil War literature. As he says, Beauregard is one of the few generals who fought through every phase of the Civil War. He was there when the first shot was fired at Sumter, and he was beside Joe

Johnston when the last major Confederate force surrendered after Appomattox. He was one of the 8 full generals of the Confederacy. Yet he has remained something of a mystery. In this book, Beauregard the man gets more attention than Beauregard the general. There are some weaknesses in the author's grasp of military affairs, as there were in his previous book, *Lincoln and His Generals*. The author might make more than one reader shudder when he applies that nondescript modern appellation "GI" to the Confederate soldier.

Even after all these years, Beauregard doesn't quite fit any standard model or pattern. Unlike most Confederate generals he became a reasonably well-to-do man after the war, mostly because of his participation in the rather dubious Louisiana State Lottery. Then there were his flirtations during the war. Did he carry them beyond the flirtation stage as did that enterprising Confederate cavalryman Van Dorn? It is doubtful, but there were plenty who thought so, and there were always enough gay young belles like the Cary sisters about his camp to warrant the suspicion. Perhaps after all these years Beauregard still has us foxed. Even so, the Civil War fan will have many hours of pleasure attempting to unravel the enigmatic character of this Creole general.

Reviewed by Capt P. C. Roe

New Teeth for the Dragon . . .

THE RISE OF MILITARY POWER IN MODERN CHINA, 1895-1912. By Ralph L. Powell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. \$5.00

The value of knowing your enemy is indisputable. A knowledge of the history of your enemy's institutions and their development is essential to knowing him. Ralph L. Powell has filled an existing gap of our knowledge of China by providing this study of modern Chinese military institutions during their formative period.

A misunderstanding of a country's military character can become politically embarrassing. Prior to China's aggression in Korea in 1950 the popular stereotype held the Chinese to be peaceful and to make inept soldiers. This resulted from the pattern of thought about China's 18th and 19th Century history as a civil society. Actually, as the author shows, China has grown military minded and has worked to modernize her military forces since the mid-19th Century. And, since the Revolution of 1911, military men have played an ever-increasing role in political affairs.

The author builds on a background of Manchu military institutions from the 17th to the 19th Centuries. He further traces these developments, from

the failure of government forces to completely put down the Taiping Rebellion to subsequent failures against foreign troops in the Opium and Arrow wars, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The final and most important phase, that from the Sino-Japanese War to the 1911 Revolution, is covered extensively and in great detail.

The backwardness of Chinese armies until 1900 is unbelievable. Yet upon reflection, it will be realized that up until 1850 China was not threatened from without and so had little incentive to develop modern forces. In the early 1600s when European armies were discarding pikes for muskets the basic Chinese man-at-arms was a horse archer. By the mid-1800s when Western armies were adopting rifled and breech-loading firearms, the Chinese still relied on horse archers, swords and spears with the addition of crude matchlocks. Not only were the weapons antiquated, but so was every other aspect; organization, communications, supply, personnel and training.

The mission of Chinese armed forces was internal security, but the Taipings proved them inadequate for even that. Tests against foreign armies spurred the various degrees of modernization at both national and provincial level. Nevertheless, modernization moved slowly and unevenly in the grip of apathy and the dead hand of tradition. Anomalies, such as modern arsenals capable of producing the latest small arms which were instead producing ancient matchlocks. Until 1898, examination for initial commissions consisted of archery, swordsmanship and weight lifting. These illustrate the problems besetting the military reformers.

The humiliation of defeat by another Oriental country in the Sino-Japanese War, followed by further defeat by Japanese and Western nations in the Boxer Rebellion and the personal discomfort to the Empress Dowager of having to flee Peking, convinced that ruler that reforms were necessary and inevitable. From then until 1911 progress was rapid and wide spread.

Traditionally, control in the Empire was decentralized. This, coupled with the development of personal and provincial armies and the decay of Imperial rule led to the 1911 Rebellion and the subsequent period of warlordism which lasted at least until the consolidation of Communist power in 1950. All of these war lords (Chaing-Kai Chek and Mao's Chu Teh included), who divided and fought over China for 40 years, received their military education in the burgeoning military academies of the significant 1895 to 1911 period.

As a result of a post World War II tour

of duty in China, Powell resolved to investigate the role of military power in modern China, the development of modern forces and the misconceptions concerning China's military potential. His ultimate aim was to outline the influence and characteristics of Nationalist and Communist troops. He soon found in research, however, that before recent developments could be properly analyzed a full scale treatment of background material was indicated. Thus this book came into being. While it does not go very much beyond 1912, it is hoped that Powell will complete the task he originally set for himself and trace Chinese military history from that year to the present.

The author gives two objectives of his work. The first is to show the growth of semi-personal armies and the rise of militarists to a position which permitted them to seize power upon the breakdown of the Manchu Dynasty. The second is to trace the modernization of the land forces of the Chinese Empire and to evaluate the degree of progress that was made. Dr Ralph L. Powell, a Marine Reserve Major and member of the staff of the National War College, has written a book that long will be regarded as a benchmark study in this field.

Reviewed by LtCol Brooke Nihart

Tough Sledding . . .

TWO YEARS IN THE ANTARCTIC.

By E. W. Kevin Walton. New York, N. Y.: Philosophical Library. 194 pages. Illustrated with photos and maps. \$4.75

Two Years in the Antarctic is the story of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, and in particular, that of 10 men who landed in the Marguerite Bay area of Graham Land in early 1946, as part of this survey. This narrative, unlike others that have been written about that frozen land in the far South, deals not in the main with dangers and hardships of arctic living and travel, but rather with the method and equipment necessary to exist and be reasonably comfortable under those conditions. British cold weather shelters, both huts and tents are discussed, as is the proper erection of these shelters. The British methods of sledging, as compared to North American methods are covered in detail. Rations, fuel, sledge dogs and clothing are other items described by Mr Walton.

Two Years in the Antarctic is not an exciting story, but for those who want to know, in minute detail, the training, organization and planning which must go into an expedition such as Mr Walton describes, it is well worth the reading.

Reviewed by Maj G. P. Averill

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
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
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